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1. Benjamin A4. Friedman 
Views on the Likelihood of Financial Crisis 
Financial crises have traditionally attracted a peculiar fascination. It is difficult 
to specify with precision just what a financial crisis is, but most people in the 
business and financial world apparently sense that they would recognize one 
if  they experienced it. More important, the fear of financial crisis is often a 
key  motivation  underlying  actions  in  both  the  private  and  public  policy 
spheres. 
Concern about the likelihood of  a financial crisis in the United States has 
become more widespread in recent years for several reasons.  First, the wave 
of  restructurings and reorganizations that has affected much of  U.S. corporate 
business in the 1980s has, in one way or another, typically involved the sub- 
stitution of debt for equity capitalization. As a result, the corporate  sector’s 
interest burden has risen sharply compared to its earnings, thereby prompting 
questions about the ability of more heavily indebted firms to meet their obli- 
gations in the event of a general slowdown in nonfinancial economic activity. 
This substitution of debt for equity has not merely involved a few individual 
transactions  large enough to attract attention under any circumstances-$2S 
billion for RJR Nabisco, for example-but  has also reached a scale that is 
hard to ignore at the aggregate level. During the six years between  1984 and 
1989, the volume of  equity that U.S. firms in nonfinancial lines of business 
retired,  through various restructuring transactions,  exceeded the  gross pro- 
ceeds of  nonfinancial firms’ new equity issues by $575 billion. 
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Second, the actual record of failures of both nonfinancial firms and finan- 
cial intermediaries has been extraordinary in the 1980s. The business expan- 
sion following the severe 1981-82  recession was the first on record in which 
the failure rate among nonfinancial businesses continued to rise long after the 
recession ended, rather than dropping back to pre-recession levels. Moreover, 
on inspection it is clear that this phenomenon has not been merely the natural 
counterpart of an unusually large number of new business start-ups. (Contrary 
to popular impressions, the 1980s has not been an unusually fertile period for 
new  business formation activity in the United States.) Within the financial 
intermediary system,  both  the actual failure experience and  the perceived 
threat of further failures have been unprecedented since the 1930s. More than 
1,000 commercial  banks  failed  during  198  1-89-including  206  in  1989 
alone-versus  only 79 during the 1970s and just 91 from the end of  World 
War I1 through 1970. Hundreds of savings and loan institutions became insol- 
vent in the 1980s, yet continued to operate anyway because the FSLIC (unlike 
the FDIC) lacked the resources to close them; in 1989 Congress voted a bail- 
out plan for the thrift industry that will cost far in excess of $100 billion. 
Yet  a third reason for the increased worry about a financial crisis is the 
shock of  the October  1987 stock market crash. Unlike many previous dra- 
matic declines in stock prices, the drop of 23% in one day (or 33% compared 
to the peak two months earlier) led to neither a financial crisis nor a business 
recession. But the crash vividly demonstrated that the vulnerability of  values 
already experienced in  recent years in the markets for more specialized as- 
sets-for  example,  farm land,  oil reserves, and loans to developing coun- 
tries-also  extended to so general a class of assets as ownership claims on all 
of  American business. Further, the manifest failure of  various “portfolio in- 
surance” schemes to serve their intended purpose cured many institutional 
investors of the illusion that even if a financial crisis did bring a broadly based 
decline in asset values, their own holdings would somehow be insulated. 
These developments notwithstanding, prevailing attitudes toward the pos- 
sibility of financial crisis are neither unanimous nor unambiguous. The most 
familiar concern is that some contractionary disturbance to business activity 
could result in a cumulative inability of debtors to meet their obligations, pos- 
sibly leading to some form of rupture in the financial system that in turn might 
further depress the nonfinancial economy. But no one (to my knowledge) has 
clearly indicated what set of circumstances would lead to such an outcome, 
much less suggested how probable those circumstances now are. In addition, 
there are some arguments for discounting the importance of the changes that 
have taken place in this regard in the  1980s. For example, some observers 
have argued that most of the substitution of debt for equity in recent years has 
occurred in the context of reorganizations that are likely to promote business 
efficiency and hence provide the higher earnings with which to service the 
added debt; also, that these transactions are explicitly designed to minimize 
conventional bankruptcy problems in  the event that the anticipated higher 21  The Risks of Financial Crises 
earnings do not materialize.  Others have pointed out that even after the refi- 
nancings of the 1980s, U.S. corporations on average remain much less highly 
levered than their counterparts abroad. 
Whether or not  they are valid under today’s specific circumstances,  con- 
cerns about the likelihood of a financial crisis do reflect a long history of such 
events playing a major role in the most visible and memorable business fluc- 
tuations. The most severe business downturns that have occurred in the United 
States-for  example, those commonly  called “depressions”-have  in every 
case been either preceded or accompanied by a recognizable financial crisis. 
Moreover,  while each financial  crisis is idiosyncratic in some respects,  ac- 
cording to at least some lines of thinking the role of  financial crises in this 
context  is  not  accidental  but  fundamental  to  economic  behavior  in  an 
investment-oriented  private  enterprise  system.  At  the  same time,  there  is 
widespread recognition that the likelihood that such a system will experience 
a financial crisis under any given set of circumstances also depends on insti- 
tutional safeguards and other factors subject at least in part to influence by 
public policy. 
The object of  this paper is to review  some of the major lines of  thinking 
about the likelihood of a financial crisis that have emerged in response to the 
events of the 1980s. Section 1.1 briefly sets this review in context by referring 
to the  long-standing  tradition of emphasis on financial crises and their real 
economic  consequences.  Section  1.2 outlines the  view  that  the  large-scale 
substitution of debt for equity by  U.S.  nonfinancial  corporations during the 
1980s reduced  the economy’s ability to sustain fluctuations  in business ac- 
tivity  without  borrowers’  defaulting  on their obligations in  unusually  great 
numbers  and  volume.  By  contrast, section  1.3 examines  several  different 
arguments for rejecting concerns about borrowers’ ability to meet their obli- 
gations. Section 1.4 shifts the focus from borrowers to lenders and considers 
the ability of both commercial banks and thrift institutions to withstand a de- 
fault  experience of  major  proportion.  Section  1.5 summarizes  the  paper’s 
principal conclusions. 
1.1  Financial Crises in Historical Perspective 
Few students of  economics or business are not familiar with some of  the 
major episodes in the past that are easily recognizable as financial crises. The 
bursting of the “tulip mania” in 1636 and of the “South Sea Bubble” in  1720, 
the East Indian Company crisis in  1772, the collapse of the railway boom in 
1846, the failure of Union Generale in  1881 and of Baring Brothers in  1890, 
the U.S. banking panics of 1873, 1893, and 1907, the failure of the Creditan- 
stalt in  1931 and the worldwide bank collapse of the next two years, and, of 
course, Black Thursday  in October  1929: all this is standard lore, typically 
related nowadays with substantial color and even sometimes a hint of nostal- 22  Benjamin M. Friedman 
gia.  In fact, although financial crises as such are more difficult to recognize 
in more primitive institutional environments, the history of such episodes is 
substantially more ancient.2 
The typical features  of these events include,  in Minsky’s classic descrip- 
tion, “large-scale defaults by both financial and nonfinancial units, as well as 
sharply falling incomes and prices” (1963, 101). Beyond that, however, it is 
difficult to generalize.  Some financial crises have been the inevitable (at least 
in retrospect) end product of speculative excesses that carried asset prices to 
levels far beyond any plausible relationship to the corresponding fundamental 
values. Others-especially  those that have followed the onset of war or other 
major  political  events-have  themselves  presumably  resulted  from  sudden 
reassessments of fundamental  values. Still others have resulted from foolish 
decisions, or bad luck, at specific financial institutions that were large enough 
and central enough to impair the system as a whole when they failed to honor 
their commitments.  Yet another entire range of influences, not mutually exclu- 
sive with any of the above, has typically arisen from the nonfinancial econ- 
omy. Incomes can and do decline for reasons other than financial crisis. And 
when they do, on a sufficient scale, the ensuing defaults have at times led to 
crises in the financial system. 
While events in the nonfinancial economy may or may not be the proximate 
cause of financial crises, the main reason why financial crises are of such great 
interest from a public policy perspective is presumably the impact that they in 
turn exert on nonfinancial economic activity. The idea of influences running 
in this direction is also well known, even if the substantive nature of the be- 
havioral mechanisms  involved is not. Of the  six U.S.  economic downturns 
during 1867-1960  considered by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) to have been 
severe, banking  crises either preceded or accompanied the  onset of  four- 
those beginning in 1873, 1893, 1907, and 1929.3  The bank panic of 1837 also 
apparently played a major role in accounting for the severe economic down- 
turn that began in that year (Temin 1969). Sharp declines in stock prices also 
occurred  in each of  these  five years.  Among U.S. economic downturns of 
lesser magnitude, banking panics occurred in conjunction with (although not 
necessarily  at the  inception  of) those  beginning  in  1857,  1882,  1899 and 
1902. 
It is not surprising that growing awareness of the effect of financial crises 
on the nonfinancial economy has often prompted a policy response. The two 
leading examples in the  United  States within the twentieth century are the 
1. The  best  general reference  is  Kindleberger (1978). Sprague  (1910) and  Friedman  and 
Schwartz (1963) provide useful chronologies for the United States. Galbraith’s (1954) account of 
the 1929 stock market crash and its aftermath is a jewel. 
2. See, e.g.,  Gibbon’s ([1776]  1932) discussion of financial developments in the later Roman 
period. 
3. The two exceptions were the recessions beginning in  1920 and 1937. See the useful tables in 
Schwert (1989, 102, 105). 23  The Risks of  Financial Crises 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System in the aftermath of the panic of 
1907 and the severe recession of 1907-8,  and the separation and reform of the 
banking  and  securities  industries  after  the  1929-33  depression.  Minsky ’s 
(1963,  102) interpretation  of  the post-Depression  banking changes  is espe- 
cially apt: “As the institutions were reformed at a time when the lack of effec- 
tiveness and perhaps even the perverse behavior of the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem  during the  great  downswing  was obvious, the changes created  special 
institutions,  such  as the  various  deposit  and  mortgage  insurance  schemes, 
which both made some of the initial lender of last resort functions automatic 
and removed their administration from the Federal Reserve System.” 
Despite the general agreement on the desirability of shielding the nonfinan- 
cia1 economy from effects due to financial crises, the way in which these ef- 
fects operate remains unclear. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) emphasized the 
role of financial crises in creating sudden reductions in the quantity of money 
held by the public, especially during episodes involving widespread bank fail- 
ures or (as in the panics of both  1893 and 1907) suspensions of convertibility 
of deposits into currency.  By contrast, Fisher’s (1933) notion of “debt defla- 
tion” focused on the market for credit rather than money. More recently, Ber- 
nanke  (1983) and  Mankiw (1986) have  further developed  Fisher’s  idea by 
making explicit the role of banks as specialized institutions able to allocate 
credit on the basis of their superior ability to collect and process relevant in- 
formation about would-be borrowers  and their prospects.  By compromising 
banks’ (and perhaps other specialized lenders’) ability to serve this function, 
a financial crisis therefore removes a necessary ingredient to many spending 
decisions. 
Not everyone has regarded the nonfinancial consequences of occasional fi- 
nancial crises as wholly bad, however.  Schumpeter (1934), for example, fo- 
cused on the role of severe business downturns in freeing economic resources 
to move to more productive uses. Without a fairly severe downturn from time 
to time, the varied relationships and habits that make up the fabric of  everyday 
business dealings would tend to lock both people and capital in place, even if 
technology and other conditions determining the best allocation of the soci- 
ety’s resources were changing over time. According to Schumpeter the posi- 
tive role of occasional  financial crises, including especially the widespread 
abrogation of contracts, is to provide enough pressure to break through these 
rigidities. 
Finally,  under  any  of  these  notions  of  how  financial  crises  affect  non- 
financial  economic activity-the  money-destruction  view  of  Friedman  and 
Schwartz, or Fisher’s debt-deflation alternative,  or even Schumpeter’s more 
benign perspective-there  remains  the question of  whether financial  crises 
themselves occur in a purely random fashion or more systematically. The most 
intriguing idea advanced along these  lines, and the one that bears most  di- 
rectly on the current situation in the United States, is Minsky’s “financial in- 
stability hypothesis,” according to which as time passes since the last financial 24  Benjamin M. Friedman 
crisis, the relevant behavior changes in such a way  as to increase the likeli- 
hood of  the next crisk4  In particular, either borrowers take on more debt 
relative to their earnings, or they (and perhaps lenders too) hold relatively less 
liquidity, or both. But, for a shock of any given size to the typical borrower’s 
earnings, the probability of experiencing defaults on a scale sufficient to im- 
pair the functioning of the system as a whole depends both on the volume of 
debt to be serviced and on the reserve of liquidity behind it. For a given distri- 
bution of  shocks to which the economy is subject in the ordinary course of 
events, therefore, the likelihood of  a financial crisis rises over time as the 
memory of the last such crisis fades. Whether the specific changes in the be- 
havior of  borrowers and lenders that have attracted so much attention during 
the 1980s correspond well or poorly to Minsky’s hypothesis remains an open 
question. 
1.2  Concerns about Corporate Indebtedness 
The phenomenon of the 1980s that has accounted for the greatest part of the 
spreading concern about the U.S. economy’s vulnerability to financial crisis 
is the leveraging of the nonfinancial corporate business sector. As  Kaufman 
(1986a, 1986b) and Friedman (1986, 1988) (among others) have emphasized, 
corporate borrowing in the last decade has differed from prior experience both 
in scale and in purpose. U.S. businesses have not only borrowed in far greater 
volume than in the past, but have used a much greater share of the proceeds of 
that borrowing to pay down their own and other companies’ equity rather than 
to put in place new earning assets. As a result, the share of earnings, or cash 
flow, that the typical company needs to devote to keeping current on its debt 
service has risen to record levels. 
Figure 1.1 documents this increased interest drain at the aggregate level by 
showing the ratio of interest payments to available earnings before interest and 
taxes, since World War 11,  for corporate and noncorporate firms engaged in 
nonfinancial lines of business in the United States. For purposes of compari- 
son, the figure also shows the ratio of  personal interest payments to pretax 
personal income. 
Especially for the corporate sector, the deterioration of  interest coverage 
since 1980 has been dramatic. On average during the 1950s and 1960s, it took 
16@  of every dollar of pretax (and pre-interest) earnings to pay corporations’ 
interest bills. The corresponding average for the 1970s was 33g. Thus far in 
the  1980s it has been 55g. In no year since  1981 has the interest share of 
earnings been below 50@  on the dollar. 
Indeed, the corporate sector’s experience in this regard since 1981 vividly 
4. See Minsky (1963, 1964, 1972, 1977). The rationale motivating the behavioral changes that 
drive the “financial instability hypothesis” is not fully specified in Minsky’s work; see Friedman 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Interest payments as a share of available earnings, 1946-88 
demonstrates  the  impact  of  continued  massive  borrowing  for  purposes  of 
equity  substitution rather than asset creation.  In  1982, at the bottom  of  the 
most severe business downturn  since the  1930s, aggregate pretax corporate 
earnings (before interest payments) were depressed by 11% from year-earlier 
levels, and the interest rate on short-term business borrowing reached a record 
16.66% (in May). Not surprisingly,  the share of  corporations’ earnings re- 
quired to meet their interest bills also rose to a record level, 59$ out of every 
dollar. By 1986 earnings had rebounded by 25%, and the average short-term 
borrowing rate was down to 6.39%. But by then corporations had taken on so 
much additional debt that, in 1986, interest payments were up to 60$ of every 
dollar of earnings, yet a new record. By 1989 earnings had risen still further, 
to 42% above the  1986 level, and the average short-term borrowing rate was 
8.80%. But with the further borrowing that had taken place, interest payments 
still stood at 57$ of every dollar of earnings. 
The experience of  unincorporated  businesses  resembled  that of corpora- 
tions until the 1980s, but since then it has differed sharply. Mirroring the cor- 
porate  sector’s  interest-to-earnings  ratio,  the  noncorporate  sector’s  interest 
payments rose from only 6$ of every dollar of pretax (and pre-interest) earn- 
ings on average in the 1950s and 1960s to 17$ on average in the  1970s, and 
33$ in the 1980s. But after peaking at 40$ on the dollar in 1982-to  recall, 
the bottom of the recession-interest  payments as a share of earnings dropped 
to only 30$ on the dollar by 1989. 
In  contrast  to  corporations  or  unincorporated  businesses,  the  trend  of 
household-sector  interest  payments  in  the  1980s has  shown no  noticeable 
break with prior experience. Personal interest payments averaged 4$ of every 
dollar of pretax  (and pre-interest) personal income in the  1950s and  1960s, 
and 5$ in the  1970s. Thus far in the  1980s the average has been  8$. As  of 





for every year during 1984-89  falling within the narrow range of 7.6+8.0$ 
on the dollar. 
Finally, figure 1.2 presents an alternative perspective on business borrow- 
ers'  ability to meet their current obligations by  showing, separately for the 
corporate and noncorporate sectors, the ratio of interest payments to cash flow 
including earnings (as in fig. 1.1) plus depreciation. Interest payments look 
smaller compared to this expanded measure of  ability to pay,  of  course, but 
the overall trends are roughly the same as those shown in figure 1.1. Most 
important, the corporate sector's ratio of  interest payments to cash flow also 
rose dramatically during the late  1970s and the back-to-back recessions of 
1980 and 1981-82, and, despite the strong recovery of cash flow and the gen- 
eral fall in interest rates, as of  1988 it had shown no improvement whatever 
from the bottom of  the last recession. 
The basic reasons underlying the disparate patterns of  interest payments 
compared  to  earnings  (or cash  flow) among  corporations,  unincorporated 
businesses and households are readily apparent from table  1.1, which sum- 
marizes the changes in these three sectors' respective balance sheets between 
1980 and  1989 (scaled in each case relative to gross national product). Not 
surprisingly, since all three sectors have borrowed in record volumes during 
the 198Os, the heart of the issue in the resulting comparisons is their differing 
use of the proceeds of borrowing. 
Between 1980 and 1989 the corporate sector increased its overall debt by 
nearly one-fourth and its market debt by more than one-third, relative to the 
size of the economy. By contrast, with investment unusually weak during the 
1980s (presumably as a result,  at least in part,  of  the extraordinarily large 
federal budget deficit, which persisted long after the economy had recovered 
from the recession that began the decade), total corporate asset holdings de- 
clined by about one-tenth compared to the size of the economy, and corporate 
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Fig. 1.2  Interest payments as a share of cash flow,  1946-88 
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Table 1.1  Balance Sheet Changes, 1980-89 
1980  1989  Change  % Change 
Corporate sector: 
Assets  140.5  126.3  -  14.2  -  10.1 
Tangible  104.9  91.4  -  13.5  -  12.9 
Financial  35.6  34.9  -  .7  -  2.0 
Liabilities  45.1  56.3  11.2  24.8 
Market  29.1  39.3  10.2  35.1 
Other  16.0  17.0  1 .O  6.2 
Net worth  95.4  70.0  -  25.4  -  26.6 
Assets  60.9  63.4  2.5  4.1 
Financial  5.2  8.5  3.3  63.5 
Liabilities  18.2  27.5  9.3  51.1 
Market  15.7  23.7  8.0  51.0 
Noncorporate sector: 
Tangible  55.7  55.0  -  .7  -  1.3 
Other  2.5  I .3  -  1.2  -48.0 
Net Worth  42.7  35.9  ~  6.8  -  15.9 
Assets  365.9  388.6  22.7  6.2 
Financial  229.9  256.5  26.6  11.6 
Liabilities  52.3  66.5  14.2  27.2 
Home mortgages  33.1  43.8  10.7  32.3 
Other  19.2  22.7  3.5  18.2 
Net Worth  313.6  322.1  8.5  2.7 
Households: 
Tangible  136.0  132.1  -3.9  -2.9 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Nore; Data (except for % changes in final column) are year-end values expressed as percentages 
of  fourth-quarter GNP (at  seasonally  adjusted  annual rates).  Tangible assets  are measured  at 
reproduction cost for reproducible  assets,  and market value for land. Financial assets are mea- 
sured at book value for debt and deposits, and market value for equities. Detail may not add to 
totals because of  rounding. 
holdings of tangible assets declined by somewhat more. In short, corporations 
were borrowing not to invest but to finance transactions-including  mergers, 
acquisitions, stock repurchases,  and leveraged buy outs (LB0s)-that  merely 
paid down their own or other corporations’ equity. As a result, the corporate 
sector’s aggregate net worth declined by  more than one-fourth compared to 
the size of the economy. 
Both  the noncorporate  business  sector and the household  sector likewise 
increased their respective debt levels faster than the economy grew, but in both 
cases this borrowing financed at least some relative increase in asset holding. 
Among unincorporated businesses the increase in assets held (all of which was 
in financial assets) trailed well behind the increase in borrowing,  so that net 
worth  also declined  substantially  in  relative  terms-albeit  not  by  anything 
like the comparable decline for corporations.  Households also, at least in the 28  Benjamin M. Friedman 
aggregate, used much of their record borrowing in this decade to finance in- 
creased holdings of financial assets, so that household-sector net worth mod- 
estly increased compared to the size of the economy.5 
It is always possible, of course, that because balance-sheet data like those 
summarized in  table  1.1 value reproducible tangible assets at reproduction 
cost and exclude intangible assets (“goodwill”) altogether, they understate the 
true earning power of assets in general and corporate assets in particular. If 
so, then despite the sharp rise in interest payments as a share of  corporate 
earnings and cash flow  in the recent past, earnings in  the near future may 
increase rapidly enough to reverse the worrisome trends shown in figures 1.1 
and  1.2. Investigating this possibility is far from straightforward because of 
the obvious difficulty of measuring assets’ prospective earning power. (Stan- 
dard book values are irrelevant for this purpose.) Nevertheless, the possibility 
of undermeasurement of assets in this way is sufficiently important to warrant 
making at least some attempt to grapple with the issue. 
The stock market, where prices in principle reflect market participants’ col- 
lective judgment about future earnings, provides one way of doing so for the 
corporate sector. Figure 1.3 plots the ratio of  the book value of  debt to the 
market value of equity for the aggregate of  U.S. nonfarm nonfinancial busi- 
ness corporations, for year-end values since World War  I1 and two other se- 
lected dates: 25 August 1987 (the stock market peak), and  19 October 1987 
(the market crash).6 The results of this calculation shed little new light on the 
issue at hand, however. As of year-end 1989, the corporate sector’s market- 
value leverage remained well below the postwar record level (above 1  .O)  set 
in  1974, when firms borrowed heavily and then the stock market crashed. But 
it likewise remained substantially above the average level that prevailed before 
then. Viewed from another perspective, aggregate leverage at year-end 1989 
stood about where it did at year-end 1980, or at the end of the 1981-82  reces- 
sion, despite that fact that by December 1989 stock prices had fully regained 
the record level previously reached in August 1987. 
It is also always possible that the impression given by the sector-aggregate 
data in figures 1.1-1.3,  or in table 1.1, may not correspond to the reality of 
borrowing and asset accumulation by individual firms and families. The fact 
that the household sector as a whole has accumulated substantial assets to 
match its record issuance of debt in the 1980s would be of limited help in the 
event of an economic downturn if the families who had bought the assets had 
little or no overlap with the families that had issued the debt. For analogous 
5. Moreover, the additional financial assets taken on by  households included not only equities 
but large amounts of deposits, government securities, and other credit market debt instruments. 
6. Year-end values are taken directly from the Federal Reserve System’s Flow of  Funds Ac- 
counts. Values for other dates are based on interpolation or extrapolation of the corporate borrow- 
ing data in the Flow of  Funds Accounts,  in conjunction with a simple equation that relates the 
Standard & Poor’s stock price index to the Flow of  Funds estimate of  the market value of equity 
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Fig. 1.3  Debt-equity ratio, U.S. nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business 
sector, 1948-86, and selected dates, 1987-89 
Sources: Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, and 
author’s calculations. 
reasons, the fact that the corporate sector as a whole has borrowed far in ex- 
cess of its creation of new assets in the 1980s would not increase the econo- 
my’s financial fragility if  the firms that had done the borrowing were mostly 
ones that had had only little debt, or excess liquidity, to begin with. Investi- 
gating the possibility of such a divergence between the aggregate data and the 
disaggregated reality is difficult for the household sector because of the pau- 
city of  available information on individual families’ holdings.’ By  contrast, 
disaggregated data on the corporate sector are readily available, at least for 
the larger firms. 
Bernanke and Campbell (1988) and Bernanke et al. (1990) used data from 
the Compustat files to study the detailed balance sheet and earnings record of 
some  1,400 U.S.  corporations for years beginning in  1969. On  the whole, 
their findings from these disaggregated data reinforce rather than contradict 
the impressions drawn above on the basis of aggregate data. For the median 
firm in their sample, interest expense rose from 13g of every dollar of  cash 
flow in  1969 to 22g in  1988. For firms in the 90th percentile for this ratio, 
however, interest expense rose from 34g of every dollar of earnings in 1969 to 
$1.86 in  1988. (In other words, by  1988 more than one firm in  10 was not 
earning its interest due.) Nor did this sharp deterioration reflect merely the 
vagaries of one year’s earnings. Compared to a trailing three-year average of 
earnings, interest expense for firms in the 90th percentile rose from 44g on the 
dollar of earnings in 1971 to $1.48 in 1988. 
An especially interesting exercise carried out by  Bernanke et al. was to 
“replay” the 198  1-82  recession in the sense of considering the implications of 
7. See Friedman (1986) for a brief examination of the Federal Reserve’s 1983 Survey of Con- 
sumer Finances from this perspective. 30  Benjamin M. Friedman 
the actual 198 1-82  percentage decline in firms’ earnings in the context of the 
typically higher debt levels taken on by  1988. The results indicated that,  in 
the absence of  some offsetting factor, default levels in such an event would 
have substantially  exceeded those experienced during the  198  1-82  recession 
itself. By the second year of  the recession, for example, firms in the 90th 
percentile of indebtedness would have had negative cash flow, and firms in the 
75th percentile  would  have had interest due equal to 72$ of every dollar of 
cash flow. 
These results are all the more striking in that firms in the Compustat sample 
apparently  did much less borrowing  than the average U.S. corporation  and 
likewise accounted for a disproportionately  small share of equity repurchases. 
In 1988, for example, firms in Bernanke et a1.k sample raised just $41 billion 
from debt issues (net of repayments) versus $198 billion for the nonfarm non- 
financial corporate business sector as a whole (as measured by the Flow of 
Funds accounts). Similarly, firms in their sample repurchased only $26 billion 
of  equity  in  1988 versus $131  billion  for the nonfinancial corporate sector 
overall. 
In  sum, the concerns raised  by  Kaufman and Friedman  on the basis of 
sector-aggregate data for balance sheets as well as interest expense compared 
to earnings (or cash flow) appear to stand up not only against correction  for 
market value of firms’ equity but also against the use of individual firm data. 
1.3  Contrasting Viewpoints 
Public discussion of the developments summarized  in section  1.2 has not 
reflected a one-sided conclusion that these trends represent any threat to the 
U.  S . economy, however.  Both academic researchers  and financial practition- 
ers have advanced a series of arguments to the effect that the increasing reli- 
ance on debt by U.S. business corporations in the  1980s has not yet exposed 
the economy to any significant risk of  financial fragility and is not likely to do 
so in the foreseeable future. 
1.3.1  Perspectives on Debt Aggregates 
To  begin, Summers (1986, 1989) has emphasized the fact that the increas- 
ing aggregate indebtedness of  both business and household borrowers in the 
1980s has represented no more than a continuation of trends that had already 
prevailed  over most of  the post-World  War  I1 period. Figure 1.4 shows the 
total outstanding indebtedness of all U.  S. borrowers other than financial inter- 
mediaries, scaled  in relation  to gross national  product, for year-end  values 
since the end of  the Korean War. The behavior of the economy’s total debt 
ratio was certainly extraordinary in the  1980s. Until the last decade, one of 
the  most  striking  features of  U.S. postwar  financial behavior  had been  the 
stable relationship between debt and economic activity. The debt ratio mea- 
sured in this way fluctuated within a very narrow range, with no evident trend 31  The Risks of  Financial Crises 
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Fig. 1.4  Outstanding debt of U.S. nonfinancial borrowers, 1953-89 
Source  Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
either up or down. By contrast, since 1980 outstanding debt has risen by one- 
third compared to the size of the economy.8 But as table 1.2 shows, a rising 
ratio of debt to income is not new for private borrowers. The outstanding debt 
of unincorporated businesses has risen, relative to the size of the economy, in 
every decade since World War 11. So has that of households.  Corporate debt 
has risen relative to gross national product in each postwar decade except the 
1970s. For each of these three borrowing  sectors, therefore,  it is difficult to 
look at figure 1.4 and identify the 1980s as a clear departure from prior post- 
war experience. 
Instead, what stands out in this regard is primarily the extraordinary behav- 
ior of the federal government's  debt ratio. Not only in the postwar period but 
in  the entire history of the United  States, back to  1789, the only sustained 
increases in the outstanding federal debt compared to the size of the economy 
took place during major wars and during the depression of the  1930s (when 
the economy itself was shrinking). With the huge budgei deficit that the gov- 
ernment ran throughout the 1980s, however-notwithstanding  the absence of 
either  war or depression-the  federal debt ratio  increased  sharply in every 
year from  1981 through  1986, and then held roughly steady through  1989. 
This extraordinary  fiscal imbalance has probably affected the U.S. economy 
in a variety of  ways, but increasing the likelihood of financial crisis is presum- 
ably not one of them. Even after the increase of  the  1980s, the federal debt 
ratio is still just back to where it was (on the way down, after World War 11)  in 
8. The mean debt ratio during 1953-80  was $135.70 of debt for every dollar of income, with 
standard deviation (based on annual data) of  only $2.90. At year-end 1980 the ratio was $137.10. 
At year-end 1989 it was $183.60. 32  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Table 1.2  Debt Ratios for Private-Sector Borrowers, 1928-89 
Nonfarm  Other 
Nonfinancial  Nonfarm 
Business  Nonfinancial 
Corporations  Businesses  Households 
1928  .45  .34  .24 
I945  .20  .06  .I3 
1950  .23  .07  .24 
I960  .30  .09  .43 
1970  .34  .14  .47 
I980  .29  .I6  .50 
1989  .39  .24  .64 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve System. 
Nore: Values shown are ratios of  year-end debt outstanding to fourth-quarter GNP (at seasonally 
adjusted annual rates). 
1962, and to date no one has voiced serious concern over the government’s 
ability to meet its obligations. 
Taggart  (1985) has  pointed  out  that,  among  private  borrowers,  sector- 
aggregate debt ratios in the 1980s have reached record levels for households 
but  not  for  businesses.  Precise  comparisons  to  the  prewar  (and  pre- 
Depression) experience are difficult to draw for several reasons, of which the 
most immediate in this context is that a greater fraction of  the nation’s busi- 
ness activity is now conducted via corporations than was the case 60 years 
ago.  As  table  1.2 shows, however, the combined debt of  corporations and 
unincorporated businesses is still well below the relative level that prevailed 
during the 1920s. 
Just what to make of  these comparisons is unclear. Summers’s interpreta- 
tion of  the  1980s as mostly a continuation of  prior postwar trends is, in the 
end, unreassuring because of the lack of any benchmark for judging how high 
is up. Carried to its logical conclusion, this argument implies that no level of 
debt compared to income would be worrisome as long as borrowers got there 
by  increasing their indebtedness along a continuation of their respective post- 
war trend lines. Nor is Taggart’s comparison to the 1920s ultimately persua- 
sive in light of the debt default experience of the 1930s. 
1.3.2  Perspectives on Firm Behavior 
In contrast to these arguments on the basis of aggregate data, Jensen (1984, 
1986,  1988,  1989a, 1989b) has developed a series of  arguments about the 
behavior of individual firms, all to the effect that the nature of the transactions 
by  which U.S. corporations have substituted debt for equity in  the  1980s is 
such as to minimize, or even alleviate altogether, the risks that have normally 
been attendant on high indebtedness in the past. 33  The Risks of  Financial Crises 
First, Jensen has argued that the “value” created for investors in leveraged 
buy outs and other forms of corporate acquisitions-value  that is apparent in 
the typically large premium paid over the previously prevailing market price 
of the acquired firm’s stock-is  a reflection of prospective gains in operating 
efficiency. In the case of leveraged buy outs in particular, Jensen has argued 
that these gains in efficiency are due to the replacement of an inferior organi- 
zational form of  management, the conventional large (and often diversified) 
corporate structure, with the superior organizational form represented by  the 
“LBO association.” Further, even apart from changes in organizational form, 
Jensen’s “free cash flow” theory of corporate behavior holds that a higher debt 
level increases managers’ incentive to  achieve operating efficiencies: “Debt 
creation, without retention of proceeds of the issue, enables managers to bond 
their promise to pay out future cash flows. . . .  The exchange of debt for stock 
helps managers overcome the normal organizational resistance to retrench- 
ment that the payout of free cash flow often requires. The threat of failure to 
make debt-service payments serves as a strong motivating force to make such 
organizations more efficient” (Jensen 1988, 29-30;  emphasis in original .) 
While this first argument implies that increased earnings are likely to be 
forthcoming to support firms’ newly increased leverage, Jensen has also pre- 
sented a second argument to the effect that the highly levered capital structure 
itself reduces creditors’ incentive to force liquidation of the firm in the event 
that the anticipated efficiency gains and consequent higher earnings do not 
materialize. The heart of this claim is that higher leverage also increases the 
value at risk in any bankruptcy proceeding, which  in turn “provides larger 
incentives to bring about private reorganization outside of the courts” (Jensen 
1989a, 413). Hence even if  the firm fails to achieve greater efficiency and 
faster earnings growth, and therefore cannot meet the increased debt-service 
payments promised, the outcome is unlikely to be a traditional default and 
bankruptcy of the kind that in the past has resulted in workers laid off, orders 
to suppliers canceled, and losses recorded on creditors’ balance sheets. 
Third, Jensen has also argued that several recent advances in financing tech- 
nology have further reduced the likelihood of a bankruptcy that would result 
in any of these undesired outcomes. One example is the use of “strip financ- 
ing,” in which each participant in a reorganization purchases an identical set 
of (inseparable) claims against the firm, ranging from secured debt to senior 
unsecured debt to junior unsecured debt to equity. The object of strip financ- 
ing, from this perspective, is to make the creditors senior to any possible di- 
viding line identical to those junior to it and thereby to preclude the emergence 
of an adversarial situation that could lead to one party’s putting the firm into 
bankruptcy. Examples of other financial innovations that reduce the ordinary 
risks attendant on high debt-service ratios are the purchase of  interest rate 
“caps,” which limit the potential increase in payments that a firm is obligated 
to make,  and “swaps,” which in effect convert nominally floating rate debt 
into fixed-rate debt. 34  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Roach (1989) has advanced  an additional argument that further buttresses 
Jensen’s confidence that the corporations that have greatly increased their lev- 
erage in the  1980s have,  for the most part, done so under specific circum- 
stances that do not represent greater financial fragility. According to Roach’s 
data, firms involved  in leveraged buy outs have been disproportionately  en- 
gaged in lines of business typically subject to smaller than average fluctuation 
of  earnings over the course of  ordinary business cycles. Food and tobacco 
companies, for example, accounted for more than 20% of  all LBO transac- 
tions effected during 1978-88  (measured by dollar size), and companies in 
retail trade accounted for nearly  another 19%. By  contrast, such cyclically 
sensitive industries  as mining, construction, and manufacturing  of  most du- 
rable  goods have experienced relatively  less LBO activity.  As  a result, the 
exposure of the newly leveraged firms to potential inability to meet their debt- 
service  payments in  the event of  recession  should  be smaller  than  if  these 
firms had been uniformly distributed throughout the U.S. corporate business 
sector. 
Once again, it is difficult to know what confidence to place in these argu- 
ments. As of the time of writing, it appears as if new patterns of  LBO activity 
are beginning to deviate from the concentration on noncyclical industries em- 
phasized  by  Roach.9 (The two most  recent  large transactions  both  involve 
airlines.) Because Jensen’s arguments are strictly forward-looking,  however, 
they are much more difficult to evaluate. 
1 .3.3  International Comparisons 
Finally,  yet another line of  argument downplaying  the significance of the 
great increase in business indebtedness  in the 1980s has emphasized the fact 
that, even today,  most U.S.  corporations remain  less highly  leveraged than 
their European or Japanese counterparts.  lo If businesses elsewhere can sustain 
much greater debt burdens, the reasoning goes, why cannot ours? 
Simple comparisons between corporate capital structures here and abroad 
fail to take into account differences in the institutional, legal, and philosophi- 
cal environment that are potentially of  great significance in this context. For- 
eign financial markets and financial institutions are typically structured very 
differently than those in the United States. Ownership of corporate debt and 
equity securities is typically  more highly concentrated than it is here, and- 
unlike  the  case in  the United  States-major  lenders  are also often  major 
equity holders  in the businesses  to which  they  lend. As a result, the entire 
relationship  between  the  financial  sector  and  nonfinancial  industry  has  a 
sharply different character. 
9.  Fox (1990) has shown that firms undergoing leveraged buy outs before around 1986 differed 
in this and other respects from those that have done so since then. 
10. As French and Poterba (1989) have shown, however, because of the great increase in Japa- 
nese  equity prices  in  the  1980s, since  1986 the market-value debt-equity ratio of  the average 
corporation has been lower in Japan than in the United States. 35  The Risks of Financial Crises 
At the same time, foreign attitudes toward competition versus cooperation 
(or even  cartelization)  within  industry  have traditionally differed from atti- 
tudes in the United States. So have attitudes toward the relationship between 
the private sector as a whole and the government, including, in particular, the 
willingness of both financial institutions and nonfinancial  firms to accede to 
various forms of governmental guidance. In some cases, a close corollary of 
this  willingness  has been  a different  set of presumptions  about the govern- 
ment's readiness to intervene, if necessary, to rescue distressed private firms. 
No one knows just how important any or all of these differences have been 
in accounting for the historically higher leverage of European and Japanese 
firms.  Much  systematic  research  needs  to be  done on such questions.  The 
findings of that research may indicate, for example, that specific changes in 
U.S. legal and institutional structures would be useful, in that they would then 
permit corporations  to adopt, with safety, debt burdens more nearly compa- 
rable to those abroad. In the absence of such changes, however-indeed,  in 
the absence even of knowledge about just which differences between institu- 
tions here and abroad are most important in this regard-the  simple fact that 
U.S. corporations'  debt burdens have not yet risen as high as those of foreign 
firms is also not reassuring. 
1.3.4 
Given  the  uncertainty  surrounding  each  of  these  disparate  sets of  argu- 
ments, the actual record of bankruptcy and default by U.S. businesses in the 
1980s may be instructive.  As figure  1.5 shows, this experience has already 
been beyond all prior comparable experience since World War 11, despite the 
sustained economic expansion that began in 1983. Bankruptcies and defaults 
have usually increased during and immediately after business recessions, but 
in prior postwar experience both had then fallen back to pre-recession levels 
not  long  after the recession  ended.  After the  1981-82  recession,  however, 
both bankruptcies and defaults continued to rise for four years during the en- 
suing expansion, and even by 1988 the bankruptcy and default rates remained 
far above any previous postwar level."  (By contrast, neither the level nor the 
persistence of delinquencies on consumer loans was at all out of the ordinary 
during or following the 1981-82  recession.) 
The fact that not only the business failure rate but the default rate too have 
been extraordinary in the 1980s is of particular significance. Popular discus- 
sion of  the increase in business bankruptcies  has sometimes suggested-er- 
roneously-that  this  phenomenon  is merely  the reflection  of  an especially 
fertile climate for new business start-ups created by tax reduction and dereg- 
ulation  since 1980. Since new  start-ups  are much  more  likely  to fail  than 
Bankruptcies and Defaults in the 1980s 
I  I.  The data shown are the number of bankruptcies per 10,000 concerns, and the dollar volume 
of  liabilities in business failures expressed as a percentage of gross national product.  Data are 
from Dun and Bradstreet. I have adjusted values plotted for 1984-88  for a series break after 1983. 36  Benjamin M. Friedman 
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Fig.  1.5  Bankruptcy rates and default rates, 1953-88 
Source; Dun and Bradstreet; coverage does not include all industry sectors. 
going concerns, any period in which start-ups increase rapidly will also be a 
period in which failures increase rapidly, and hence the higher failure rate in 
the 1980s is supposedly a healthy sign rather than a danger signal. If  all that 
were true, however,  the failure rate would be high but not the default rate. 
New  start-ups typically do not have large amounts of liabilities. (Moreover, 
popular impressions notwithstanding,  it is also not true that the pace of busi- 
ness  start-ups  was unusually  rapid in the  1980s. The number of new busi- 
nesses incorporated each year rose at just 2.7% per annum on average during 
1980-89, vs. 6.0% per annum during 1950-80.)’* 
The specific default  experience of  the  high-yield  unsecured  debt  (“junk 
bonds”) typically issued in the course of leveraged buy outs and other corpo- 
rate  acquisitions  has  in particular  been  subject to substantial debate. Most 
researchers  have  agreed  that the overall default rate on such  securities has 
been modest.13 By contrast, Asquith et al. (1989) have shown that this finding 
hinges on the great increase in the volume of such securities issued in recent 
years, together with the tendency for most defaults to occur only several years 
after the time of issue. Although the default rate for high-yield bonds that have 
been outstanding for several years or more is high, the “universe” of bonds 
outstanding  at any point in time consists disproportionately of bonds issued 
only  recently,  and  therefore  exhibits  only  the  familiar  modest  default  rate 
overall. 
Table 1.3, reproduced from Asquith et al. (1989, table 2), shows that the 
cumulative default rate, measured  for bonds issued in each year rises from 
12. The data are from Dun and Bradstreet. 
13. See, e.g.,  Altman and Nammacher (1985) and subsequent annual issues Table 1.3  Aged Defaults for High-Yield Bonds Grouped by Year of Issue 
Issue 
Year  1st  2d  3d  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th  11th  12th  Total 
Panel A:  % of  Par Amount Defaulted in nth  Year After Issue: 
I977  .oo  .oo  .oo  .  00  .oo  .oo 
1978  .OO  8.32  .OO  1.39  .oo  7.91 
1979  .OO  .OO  5.54  1.11  2.38  6.73 
1980  .OO  .57  2.45  .  00  .OO  13.90 
1981  .OO  6.05  .OO  8.06  6.85  .oo 
1982  1.00  2.41  1.61  11.49  .oo  9.44 
1983  .OO  .OO  6.08  7.83  4.80  so' 
1984  2.29  1.99  2.03  3.06  .oo' 
1985  .OO  .80  2.28  .45= 
1986  2.73  3.84  1.57' 
Panel B: Cumulated 9'0  of Par Amount Defaulted for x Years After Issue: 
1977  .oo  .oo  .oo  .oo  .oo  .OO 
1978  .oO  8.32  8.32  9.71  9.71  17.61 
1979  .OO  .OO  5.54  6.65  9.03  15.76 
1980  .OO  .57  3.03  3.03  3.03  16.93 
1981  .oO  6.05  6.05  14.11  20.97  20.97 
1982  1.00  3.41  5.02  16.51  16.51  25.95 
1983  .OO  .OO  6.08  13.91  18.71  19.21' 
1984  2.29  4.28  6.32  9.38  9.38' 
1985  .OO  .80  3.08  3.53a 





























































Source: Asquith et al. (1989). 
Note:  In this table an  nth year default is defined as a default within n  X  365 days of  the issue date. High-yield bonds are all bonds rated below 
investment grade at issue date by Moody's and Standard & Poor (S&P). Defaults are defined as a declaration of default by  the bond's trustee, filing 
of  bankruptcy by  the firm, or assignment of  a D rating by  S&P for a missed coupon payment. 
"May  be incomplete. i.e., entire sample may not have been outstanding for x years. 38  Benjamin M. Friedman 
only 3%-8%  after three years to 25%-33%  after 10 years. Nevertheless, with 
$3 1 billion of junk bonds issued in 1986 and $ I3 billion per annum on average 
in 1984-85  versus only $1 billion per annum on average during 1977-82,  the 
overall default rate for all bonds issued during  1977-86  remains just 8%. No 
doubt the patterns shown in table 1.3 reflect not just the passage of time per se 
but also the fact that firms issuing bonds since 1983 have not had to face the 
burden of meeting debt-service payments during a recession. At least until the 
next recession  occurs, however,  separating out these two factors will remain 
difficult if not impossible. 
1.4  Focus on the Banks 
The evidence and arguments presented in sections 1.2 and 1.3 bear entirely 
on the question of whether, and under what circumstances, the borrowers that 
have taken on greatly enlarged debt-service burdens in the 1980s may be un- 
able to meet their commitments. In some contexts-for  example, setting the 
right  price  on junk bond portfolios  or evaluating  the prospects  for specific 
borrowers  or  even  specific  industries-this  is  all  that  matters.  From  the 
broader  perspective  of  assessing the likelihood  of  financial crisis, however, 
the ability of lenders to absorb portfolio losses is also crucial. Given the his- 
tory of financial crises, the strength of  those lenders that also function as fi- 
nancial intermediaries is of particular importance in this regard. 
Financial  crises in the past have invariably involved not just debt defaults 
by nonfinancial borrowers but either the threat or the actuality of a rupture of 
the financial system. Indeed, as long as financial intermediaries continue both 
to create deposits and to extend credit, the economy as a whole is likely to 
remain insulated from a cumulative default experience capable of sharply cur- 
tailing nonfinancial economic activity. After all, that is why the “lender of last 
resort” policies of central banks (and, occasionally, other governmental agen- 
cies) usually  focus on  avoiding  the  failure of  financial  institutions,  even 
though their underlying public policy objective is far broader.  Although the 
solvency of the U.S. financial intermediary system has already received enor- 
mous attention elsewhere-banks,  primarily, in the context of loans to devel- 
oping countries, thrift institutions in the context of  the recent plague of insol- 
vencies and the subsequent rnultihundred billion dollar bailout-the  issue is 
important enough to warrant at least some attention here as well. 
Table  1.4, adapted  from Brumbaugh et al.  (1989), shows  how  the  $2.9 
trillion of assets-and  hence deposits-held  as of September 1988 at all U.S. 
commercial banks of size greater than  $50 million  was  distributed  among 
banks according to each bank’s ratio of risk-adjusted capital to total assets.  l4 
14. See Brumbaugh et al. (1989), table 5. “Risk-adjusted capital” is detined as equity plus 
perpetual preferred stock plus subordinated debt and limited preferred stock, minus investments 
in unconsolidated subsidiaries. 39  The Risks of  Financial Crises 
Table 1.4  Distribution of Bank Assets by Capital-Asset Ratio 
Ratio of Risk-adjusted  Number  Assets 
Capital to Total Assets  of Banks  ($1 
Negative 
0%-3% 
6%  + 
3%-6% 
Total 
28  22.5 
48  43.4 
150  926.0 
5,094  1,894.5 
5,320  2,886.4 
Source: Brumbaugh et al. (1989). 
Note: Asset figures are in billions of  dollars. Data are for September 1988. 
Almost $1 trillion of  this total was held at banks with capital-asset ratios be- 
low 6%,  and, in  some cases, far below  that percentage even with  all bank 
assets counted at full book value. 
What makes this situation either more or less likely to lead to a potential 
problem, depending on one’s perspective, is the extreme concentration of this 
$1 trillion of assets among the nation’s largest banks. Individual banks’ year- 
end  data  for fiscal years  ending in  1988 showed a total  of $833 billion of 
assets-well  over a quarter of the $2.9 trillion  shown in table 1.4-held  by 
the largest  15 banks.  Again with all bank assets counted at full book value, 
these banks had capital-asset ratios ranging from 1.49% (NCNB of Texas) to 
6.89% (Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.). The average capital-asset ratio for all 
15 banks, weighted by assets, was 4.34%. But merely assuming a reserve for 
LDC loan losses equal to 50% of  each bank’s exposure reduced the average 
capital-asset ratio for the group to 3.17%, and for the more exposed banks the 
erosion consequent on allowing a 50% reserve against LDC loans was even 
greater.  For Manufacturers  Hanover,  for example, allowing this reserve re- 
duced the capital-asset  ratio  from 5.31% to  1.44%. Doing so for Bank  of 
America reduced its ratio from 3.7  1  % to 1.48%.  l5 
Further, these same banks are also among the most heavily committed to 
financing leveraged buy outs. As of the most recent available data, 12 of the 
nation’s  15  largest banks each had  more than  $1  billion  in LBO exposure, 
including loans already outstanding plus unfunded commitments. Total expo- 
sure among these 12 amounted to $37 billion-more  than their combined total 
capital, even including all LDC loans at full book value. Manufacturers Hano- 
ver, for example, which had $3.3 billion of capital as reported, or only $900 
million after allowing a 50% reserve against LDC loans, had $5.1 billion in 
LBO exposure  including $3.5 billion  of  loans already outstanding.  Bankers 
Trust, which had $2.6 billion of reported capital, or $1.5 billion after a 50% 
reserve against LDC loans, had $5.0 billion of total LBO exposure including 
$3.6 billion in loans already outstanding. l6 
15. Data described here are from Brumbaugh et a]. (1989), table 6. 
16. Data described here are from Quint (1989). 40  Benjamin M. Friedman 
In sum, the largest  U.S. banks’ holdings of debt issued in the course of 
leveraged  buy  outs alone-not  to mention  other corporate  reorganizations 
also  involving  the  substitution  of  debt  for  equity  capitalization-already 
bulks large compared to these banks’ thin margins of capital. Because other 
lenders (e.g., life insurance companies) have also participated heavily in fi- 
nancing  corporate reorganizations,  while  most  developing  countries  have 
been able to borrow only from banks, banks’ total LBO exposure remains well 
below their total LDC exposure (see Krugman in this volume). Nevertheless, 
exposure to risk  via LBO debt and other high-leverage  corporate  situations 
has grown to a magnitude that also represents a potential problem in the event 
of any systemic default experience. Moreover, the circumstances under which 
large numbers of highly levered U.S.  corporations would be unable to meet 
their obligations-a  severe business recession, for example-overlap  consid- 
erably with circumstances under which many developing countries would find 
servicing their debts even more problematic than is already the case. 
By contrast, debt securities issued in corporate reorganizations are appar- 
ently less of a factor in the current troubled situation of U.S. thrift institutions. 
The Garn-St.  Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 authorized feder- 
ally  chartered thrift  institutions  to hold  up  to  11% of  their  assets  in junk 
bonds,  and state-chartered  institutions have faced more generous limitations 
in some cases. California, for example, in principle imposes a 15% limit (al- 
though one large California institution had 29% of its consolidated assets in 
junk bonds as of March  1988). Nevertheless, as of September 1988 only 161 
of  the  more  than  3,000 FSLIC-insured  thrift  institutions  owned  any junk 
bonds at all, and among those that did, in most cases their holdings were well 
within these limits. 
Thrifts that became insolvent in 1987, for example, held only 0.2% of their 
combined total assets in junk bonds, and only  1.9% in commercial loans of 
all kinds (see Brumbaugh et al.  1989, table 13). As of September  1988, all 
thrift institutions combined held only $13 billion of junk bonds, or about 5% 
of  the universe of junk bonds outstanding.  These holdings were highly con- 
centrated, with 76% of the thrift industry total held at just 10 institutions and 
91  % at 25 institutions.  Although  this concentration pattern  raises questions 
about the few institutions  that do have junk bond  holdings,  a recent  GAO 
inspection found no apparently greater risk of insolvency at these institutions 
on that account (see General Accounting Office 1989). Indeed, some of the 10 
thrift  institutions  with  the  largest junk bond  holdings  have  been  unusually 
profitable. 
1.5  Summary of Conclusions 
The evidence and arguments reviewed in this paper support several specific 
conclusions.  First, financial crises have historically had a major role in large 
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prior to, or at the inception of, each of the half dozen or so most severe re- 
corded  declines in  U.S. economic  activity.  Before  World  War  I1  financial 
crises occurred in conjunction with most other business downturns as well. 
Second, the proclivity of private borrowers to take on debt in the 1980s has 
been extraordinary by postwar standards. Among business borrowers, includ- 
ing especially corporations, much of the proceeds of  this surge in debt issu- 
ance  has  gone to pay  down equity  (either the  borrower’s  or another  com- 
pany’s) rather than to put in place new earning assets.  As a result,  interest 
payments have risen dramatically  compared to either earnings or cash flow. 
The corporate business sector’s debt-service burden, relative to either earnings 
or cash flow, rose to record highs in the early 1980s and has remained at record 
levels despite sharp declines in nominal interest rates and a sustained expan- 
sion of business profits. 
Although  there are arguments  both for and  against the view  that this  in- 
crease in business leverage raises the prospective threat of widespread default 
in the event of a generalized decline in earnings, as would presumably  occur 
during a major recession, a third conclusion that is clear from the record to 
date is that  the rate  at which  U.S. businesses  have gone bankrupt  and de- 
faulted on their liabilities in the  1980s is already far out of line with any ex- 
perience since the 1930s. The business failure rate not only rose to a postwar 
record level during the  1981-82  recession but-in  contradiction to prior cy- 
clical patterns-continued  to rise through the first four years of  the ensuing 
recovery. The volume of  defaulted liabilities, measured relative to the size of 
the economy, behaved in a parallel way (thereby contradicting the notion that 
the businesses that failed were primarily new start-ups, of a small enough size 
not to matter much from the perspective of systemic risk). 
Fourth, the largest U.S. banks’ exposure  to debt issued in the course of 
leveraged buy outs or other transactions substituting debt for equity capitali- 
zation now exceeds their risk-adjusted capital, even with all bank assets (in- 
cluding loans to developing countries) counted at book value. Although this 
exposure is not (yet) as large as that due to banks’ LDC loans, the two sets of 
risks are not independent. 
The implications  of  these  developments  for public  policy  in  the  United 
States are, at least potentially, profound. If these trends of the 1980s together 
constitute an increase  in the economy’s financial fragility, they  increase not 
only  the  likelihood  that  the  government  will  have to act  in  its capacity  as 
lender of  last resort but also the likely magnitude of  lender-of-last-resort ac- 
tion should  such be necessary.  The responsibility for such actions has been 
decentralized since the 1930s, however, and some of the responsible govern- 
mental agencies are themselves less secure than used to be the case. For ex- 
amp!e,  the gross insufficiency of the FSLIC’s resources has already necessi- 
tated  a  multihundred  billion  dollar  bailout  of  insolvent  and  potentially 
insolvent thrift institutions,  a bailout which is to be financed in large part by 
new federal government  borrowing.  And in both  1988 and  1989, the FDIC 42  Benjamin M. Friedman 
experienced losses-in  other words, had to draw down its capital-for  the 
first time since its inception in  1934. Responding to a  renewed insolvency 
problem in the thrift industry, or, even more so, to a proportionately  equivalent 
problem in  the commercial banking system, would therefore be extremely 
challenging. 
At the same time, the Federal Reserve System also retains some responsi- 
bility to act in a lender-of-last-resort  capacity. Indeed, the basic rationale for 
the system’s creation, stated clearly in the 1913 Federal Reserve Act, was “to 
provide an  elastic currency”-precisely  so as to avoid financial crises. Should 
the exercise of  this responsibility  become necessary, doing so in a  fashion 
consistent with other Federal Reserve objectives, like maintaining price sta- 
bility, will also be challenging to say the least. 
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2.  E. Gerald Corrigan 
The Risk of  a Financial Crisis 
I am delighted to contribute to this important volume if  for no other reason 
than to find that I am not alone in my worries about the vulnerabilities of the 
economic and financial system. I should also say at the outset that the three 
background  papers  prepared  by  Ben  Friedman,  Paul  Krugman,  and  Larry 
Summers have bolstered my confidence in the work being done by academic 
economists. All three papers are first rate; they are readable, coherent, insti- 
tutionally sensitive but, most of all, they offer pragmatic guidance to someone 
like me who must bridge the gap between theory and practice. What is also 
striking about these three papers is that none dismisses the possibility  that a 
serious financial disruption  could occur, although each comes to that view 
from a somewhat different vantage point. 
0  v  e  r  v  i  e  w 
My task, as I understand it, is to add something of my own personal per- 
spective to the discussion as a whole.  With that in mind, let me start with 
several general comments. 
First, all three of the background papers grapple with the definition of “cri- 
sis,”  and  to varying  degrees they  attempt  to  distinguish  between  types  of 
crises.  While I have great difficulty coming up with neat definitions  in this 
area, some useful distinctions can be made. For example, “financial disrup- 
tions” can be distinguished from “financial crises” by means of the extent of 
the damage they inflict on the real economy. That is, the term “crises” should 
be reserved  for those episodes that cause clear and significant damage to the 
real economy. However, even that distinction may be misleading in that it may 
ignore or unduly play down the extent to which a financial disruption has the 
potential to inflict serious damage on the real economy if left unattended or if 
handled irresponsibly. 
Second, with the above distinction in mind, my personal perspective is one 
that is tempered  by  direct experience in dealing  with  quite a few financial 
disruptions but no financial crises since even the 1987 stock market disruption 
seems to have had little or no effect on the real economy. However, as sug- 
gested  above, the line between “disruption”  and “crisis”  can be fine indeed 
since it is not at all difficult to imagine circumstances in which specific “dis- 
ruptions” of the past  10 or 15 years could have tripped into the category of 
“crises.” Indeed, I can readily think of a number of examples of “financial 
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disruptions” that clearly had at least the potential for causing serious if  not 
systemic damage. 
Some might feel that this is an exaggeration. Perhaps so, but the hard fact 
is that when the phone rings, informed judgments have to be made and often 
they have to be made very quickly in the face of limited and conflicting infor- 
mation. Those initial judgments almost always center on an assessment of 
whether a given situation has systemic implications and, if so, the nature and 
extent of such implications. Those initial assessments are also always made in 
a context in which you know that losses and even failures provide a necessary 
element of discipline to the system. Thus, efforts to protect the system should 
not protect those whose miscalculations or misdeeds caused the problem in 
the first instance. 
Third, as I see it, the past  15 years have witnessed a greater number of 
financial disruptions with potential systemic implications than was  the case 
over the postwar period before 1974. And, if  we divide the 1974-89  period 
roughly in half, the latter half of that interval has seen more disruptions than 
the former, especially in a context in which the last seven years have been 
characterized by  uninterrupted economic expansion-a  point Ben Friedman 
stresses above. At the risk of oversimplification I believe there are three rea- 
sons why the past 15 years have seen such a high incidence of financial disrup- 
tions: first, macroeconomic policies and performance-perhaps  especially the 
tacit  acceptance of  deficits, debt, and  inflation-have  contributed both di- 
rectly and indirectly to elements of volatility and risk taking in financial mar- 
kets and in other elements of economic activity; second, financial innovation 
and technological advances in financial markets are two-edged swords. These 
developments clearly provide important new choices and benefits to savers 
and investors alike, but they are also the source of new elements of risk and 
volatility; finally, there is far, far too much emphasis on short-term returns and 
rewards, surely here in the United States, but elsewhere as well. 
The lust general point I would make is that I believe that, looking forward, 
the risks of financial crises-as  distinct from financial disruptions, which are 
sure to occur-are  something more than zero. Since that may be interpreted 
as  a provocative statement,  I will elaborate. It is probably fair to say that 
automatic stabilizers and other institutional changes have-as  suggested in all 
three background papers-reduced  the statistical probabilities of  a financial 
disruption turning into a crisis. But, and this is a very big but, if a crisis were 
to develop, I believe its capacity to generate major damage to the real econ- 
omy may be greater today than it was in the past. The fundamental reason for 
this is the nature,  speed,  and complexity of the operational, liquidity, and 
credit interdependencies that bind together all major financial institutions and 
markets in the world. In Bagehot’s day, and long before, the first precept in 
banking and finance was, “Know your counterparty.” Today, that is not nearly 
good enough. Indeed, in Bagehot’s day, the managers of financial institutions 
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come and profits; today that is often not the case. That, of course, raises the 
question of whether financial  management has fully caught up with today’s 
incredibly complex financial marketplace. 
Some Diagnostics of Recent Financial Disruptions 
Against that general background let me now turn to some diagnostics of the 
financial disruptions to which I have had some direct exposure over the past 
15 years to see what common denominators-if  any-may  be present. Such 
an exercise may be helpful in identifying approaches and policies that, at the 
very  least,  can  help  check  problems  when  they  arise  but  maybe-just 
maybe-also  help in the formulation of approaches that can reduce the inci- 
dence of such disruptions. 
I have already touched on the first factor I want to cite in this regard; that, 
of course, is macroeconomic policy and performance. There is no question in 
my mind that the seeds of  many of the financial disruptions we have seen in 
recent years were sown in the decade between 1969 and 1979, when attitudes 
about inflation were all too sanguine. More recently we have made the implicit 
decision that we can live with huge internal and external deficits and corre- 
sponding high  levels of public and private debt. Directly and indirectly, the 
resulting economic and financial environment produces patterns  of behavior 
and expectations that surely work to increase risk and fragility in the financial 
system. 
The second factor I would note is concentrations of activities or exposures 
by  financial  institutions.  Concentrations  take  many  forms:  exposures  to  a 
single borrower,  exposures to a single industry, exposures to a single instru- 
ment, exposures to a single class of  borrower, or exposures to a single com- 
modity. However defined, I am hard-pressed to think of a single episode of 
financial disruption in recent years that did not entail some element of concen- 
tration on the part of the institution or institutions that got into trouble. 
A third factor is what Paul Krugman calls the “bandwagon” effect. Beyond 
its obvious forms, there is a curious twist on this phenomenon. Namely, finan- 
cial innovations (new instruments, trading strategies, etc.) that initially pro- 
duce high rates of return  for the innovator tend to be very short-lived in the 
financial sector because they are so easy to duplicate. However, the bandwa- 
gon effect, reinforced by the illusion of permanent high rates of returns, tends 
to draw relatively unsophisticated players into such activities at just the wrong 
time. As a further extension of  the bandwagon effect,  there is another phe- 
nomenon  which  I  call  the  “illusion  of  liquidity.” That  is,  the  belief-ob- 
viously unfounded-held  by many market participants that they are that much 
smarter, that much quicker, or that their stop-loss strategy is that much better, 
that they  will  be able to take profits  and get out when  markets turn  while 
others take the losses. 47  The Risks of  Financial Crises 
A fourth factor that has been present  in most financial disruptions of  the 
past  15 years is the threat of dislocation in payment, settlement, or clearing 
systems. This has been reasonably well documented  in the case of  the stock 
market  crash, but  very difficult  and potentially  very  serious problems  with 
payment and settlement systems have also been encountered in other episodes 
over the past  15 years. For example, both the Herstatt situation in 1974 and 
the silver market disruption in 1980 presented major problems of this nature. 
Needless  to say, payment and settlement  systems are of  special importance 
because such systems can be the vehicle through which a localized problem 
can very quickly be transmitted  to others, thereby taking on systemic impli- 
cations. 
A fifth factor I would cite, but with some trepidation, is the possibility that 
financial markets-or  at least some segments of financial markets-may  be 
characterized by a condition of  overcrowding such that spreads and returns do 
not fully compensate for risks.  In saying this, I know full well that the text- 
books would  say this condition cannot exist for long. The textbooks  would 
also say that the solution to overcrowding is exit-graceful  or otherwise. That 
is of  course, one of the things  I  worry about. Namely, if  the overcrowding 
hypothesis is correct, can the implied shrinkage and consolidation occur in an 
orderly way, when we recognize the fact that financial institutions are not gas 
stations? 
A sixth factor that must be mentioned is plain old-fashioned greed, which 
in all too many cases has given rise to fraud and other elements of  criminal 
activity. Indeed, we have seen cases in which widespread violations of crimi- 
nal statutes have occurred; there are numerous other examples of reckless and 
irresponsible behavior that I find utterly shocking. Needless to say, the prob- 
lem of  blatantly  excessive risk taking is more likely to be a problem in the 
case of thinly capitalized institutions since the owners have so little to lose if 
things go sour. 
A seventh and final factor that must be cited relates to supervisory gaps or, 
even  worse, breakdowns in the supervisory process.  The worst example of 
this, by far, is to be found in the thrift industry situation, which saw not only 
a breakdown in the supervisory process but a public sector “bailout” of incred- 
ible proportions. However, the silver market disruption, the Ohio thrift prob- 
lem, and the stock market crash all revealed at least some troubling elements 
of  supervisory gaps or shortcomings in the supervisory process itself. Even 
today,  I  regard the absence of  any form of consolidated  oversight of  major 
securities companies as a defect in the supervisory framework in the United 
States. 
In this context, I am mindful that questions have also been raised about the 
effectiveness of the bank supervisory process in cases such as that of Conti- 
nental Illinois and the major Texas bank failures. More specifically, the ques- 
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and stop the patterns of behavior that gave rise to these problems before they 
reached the proportions that ultimately caused failures and large costs to the 
deposit insurance fund. 
While each of the financial disruptions of the past 15 years is very distinct, 
every episode I can think of had elements of most of the seven factors listed 
above associated with it. Having said that, I wish to stress that the diagnostics 
of financial disruption are useful only up to a point. What may be even more 
important are the traits of firms or markets that have generally avoided prob- 
lems or the patterns of behavior that have permitted firms to overcome prob- 
lems without reliance on public funds or other forms of public support. Here 
it is clear that comfortable margins of capital and liquidity, combined with 
diversification of activities and exposures and strong management and control 
systems, are the keys to success in avoiding problems and overcoming them 
when they arise. 
Some Myths about Financial Disruptions 
Having shed some light on common denominators that have been present in 
most if  not all of the financial disruptions of the past  15 years, I would now 
like to turn my attention to several of what I regard as popular myths that tend 
to  be associated  with the folklore of  financial disruptions.  I will cite seven 
such myths. 
First, there is the view that systemic concerns are uniquely associated with 
large financial institutions or, more particularly,  large banks.  That is simply 
not true on two counts: first, large securities houses present many of the same 
systemic issues that arise with large banks; and second, troubled institutions 
need not be large or be banks to raise systemic concerns. The best illustration 
of this is to be found in the chain of events triggered in 1985 by the failure of 
E.S.M., a small government securities firm in Florida. That seemingly incon- 
sequential  failure triggered  the Ohio and Maryland  thrift problems  and the 
failure of B .  B.  S. (a small government securities dealer in New Jersey), placed 
in jeopardy several insurance companies, and came very close to producing 
full-scale gridlock in the entire mortgage-backed  securities market. This se- 
quence of  events produced  headlines  in  newspapers  throughout  the  world, 
uncovered  hundreds of millions  of dollars in losses for the affected institu- 
tions,  and resulted  in  a number of  individuals  being convicted  of criminal 
violations.  However, none of the institutions involved was “large,” none was 
a bank, and none  had  federal deposit insurance.  Yet  by  any definition,  the 
sequence of events had the clear potential to produce systemic damage. 
The second myth I want to touch on is the bank “bailout” myth in general 
and more specifically the “too-big-to-fail”  myth. For these purposes I want to 
draw a sharp distinction between banks and thrifts because I believe it impor- 
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in the thrift industry and the extraordinary blend of  circumstances that gave 
rise to those problems. 
In banking, as historically defined, the term “bailout” is a misnomer, and I 
believe  there  is  more  to  the  distinction than  semantics.  In  point  of  fact, 
banks-including  large banks-have  failed, and, in the process, the share- 
holders and management have not been bailed out. To be sure, the process of 
closing,  merging,  and/or  recapitalizing problem or  failed  banks  has  cost 
money, but the funds used for these purposes have, virtually without excep- 
tion, been provided out of  the deposit insurance fund, which is funded by the 
banking industry itself. 
Having said that, there is no question that large, financially troubled insti- 
tutions present special difficulties simply because they,  by  definition, carry 
with them greater systemic risks and greater threats to public confidence. For 
these reasons, governments at all times and in all places have been reluctant 
to run  the risks of  the sudden and uncontrolled failure of  large depository 
institutions-a  pattern we see even in countries that have no formal deposit 
insurance system. The problem, however, is not so much that large institu- 
tions are too large to fail, for large institutions have failed. Rather, the prob- 
lem is that authorities are reluctant to tolerate the sudden and uncontrolled 
failure of large institutions and therefore generally opt for managed shrinkage, 
merger, or recapitalization in a context in which  shareholders and manage- 
ment are generally wiped out. 
Viewed in that light, neither equity holders nor senior managers of  failed 
institutions-including  large institutions-have  any reason to believe they 
will be “bailed out.” Yet,  we are all acutely sensitive to the so-called moral 
hazard problem which, in effect, postulates that banking and financial market 
participants take on undue elements of risk in the belief that public authorities 
will somehow protect them from the risks of loss and/or failure. 
There can be no doubt that the moral hazard problem is quite real, just as 
there can be  no doubt that the failure of large institutions presents special 
problems for the authorities. However, neither of  these considerations need 
imply that any institution is too large to fail or that owners and managers-at 
the least-of  such institutions will not be severely penalized by virtue of such 
failures. Perhaps the balance of risks and rewards is somewhat out of kilter- 
at least at the margin-but  even if this is true,  it does not justify the all too 
widely held view that the authorities in  this country-to  say nothing about 
other countries-systematically  and  irresponsibly bailout financial  institu- 
tions, small or large. That is not to say, however, that there is not greater room 
in the process for market discipline, for surely there is. 
The third myth I want to comment on is the one that says disclosure-or 
more disclosure-is  something of a panacea that can solve the market disci- 
pline problem. While I am obviously all in favor of  disclosure, I think it is 
sheer fantasy to assume that individual investors and depositors-and  perhaps 
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truly  informed credit judgments about highly complex financial instruments 
and institutions. Even now, we may have a condition of information overload 
in a setting  in which  even the professional  rating  agencies have their prob- 
lems. Continental Illinois and the major Texas banks were investment-grade 
rated during the time interval in which they were acquiring the assets and the 
concentrations that  led to their  demise. Once again,  this  is not  to say  that 
disclosure or better forms of disclosure cannot play a useful and constructive 
role in helping the market discipline process along, but only to suggest that 
the benefits of even the most optimal forms of disclosure are not as great as is 
assumed by many commentators. 
Fourth, there is the view that fire walls are fail-safe and can fully insulate 
the insured depository or the registered broker-dealer from the misfortunes of 
its parent or affiliated companies. Not only is that view highly questionable in 
practice but, in the extreme, fire walls can increase risk rather than contain it. 
That is if we depend excessively on legislative or regulatory fire walls we may 
encourage riskier types of behavior or we may construct barriers that stand in 
the way of prudent intracompany flows of liquidity or capital that can, in par- 
ticular circumstances, help to minimize problems.  Because of this, I believe 
strongly in the principle of consolidated  supervision, and I resist the cornbi- 
nations of banking and commercial firms. Finally, while fire walls may work 
the wrong way on safety and soundness grounds, I do believe they play a very 
necessary  and useful role in limiting conflicts of  interest and unfair competi- 
tion. 
While on the subject of  fire walls, I should also acknowledge that in the 
eyes of many practitioners the presence of complex regulatory fire walls in the 
context of the bank holding-company structure places U.S. firms at a signifi- 
cant competitive  disadvantage in relation to their international  competitors. 
While there is something to this view, it is very difficult to judge how impor- 
tant this factor may be in competitive terms. What is clear, however, is that 
the differences in structure do  introduce political tensions in the application of 
national treatment principles to banking and securities firms operating in for- 
eign markets. 
Fifth, there is a myth that market participants, or even the central bank, can 
readily distinguish liquidity problems from terminal financial problems in the 
very short run. This is simply not always the case. This reality has enormous 
implications for the way market participants will behave in the face of uncer- 
tainty, For example, had it been clear from the outset that the stock market 
crash of  1987 would not result in any solvency problems of consequence, the 
near-gridlock  conditions that prevailed  in  financial markets  at  times  in the 
days after October 19 would not have occurred. However, in the face of un- 
certainty, market participants may tend to hold back on credit extensions, de- 
lay payments, or hold back on the delivery of securities or collateral, such as 
suggested in Larry Summers’ October 1991 scenario. Unfortunately,  in these 
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become a far more serious problem,  ultimately giving rise to the risk of fail- 
ures or insolvencies. 
The inability to distinguish  liquidity from solvency problems in the very 
short run can also have implications for the supervisors and the lender of last 
resort. For the supervisor, the problem can be the legal and policy ramifica- 
tions of closing or taking over a troubled institution in a context in which it 
may be clearly capital deficient but not so clearly insolvent. For the lender of 
last resort, there is the danger of violating Bagehot’s first principle of  “never 
lending to unsound people.” I might add in this context that the problem of 
distinguishing  between liquidity and solvency becomes all the more difficult 
in a globally integrated financial system in which large institutions may have 
dozens,  if  not  hundreds, of  branches,  subsidiaries,  and  affiliates scattered 
throughout the world. 
The sixth myth I want to discuss is the view that there is something fatally 
and irreversibly flawed with the U.S. system of deposit insurance that, in turn, 
seriously complicates the moral hazard problem. Here again, I want to focus 
particularly  on commercial  bank  deposit insurance.  The argument is rather 
straightforward: namely, the mere presence of a system of officially supported 
deposit insurance-but  especially one that has gravitated  toward full insur- 
ance of all deposits-largely  eliminates market discipline and promotes ex- 
cessive risk taking. 
It seems to me that, at least in its extreme form, this argument can be chal- 
lenged on several grounds: first,  in a number of  other countries even where 
there is no system of deposit insurance, the authorities are generally no more 
willing to allow depositors to incur losses than they are in this country, and, if 
anything, in many cases they may tend to be more cautious insofar as their 
willingness to permit banks or other financial firms to fail in a disorderly man- 
ner; second, in every case of a severely troubled bank-including  those that 
have overcome problems-we  have seen significant deposit outflows. This, 
of course, suggests that at least some depositors-typically  large and/or over- 
seas depositors-do  not fully accept the notion of full insurance; finally, as 
noted earlier, shareholders and managers of failed banks have, in fact, been 
systematically and seriously penalized for their mistakes. 
These remarks should not be construed to imply that I believe that there are 
no constructive opportunities to strengthen the workings of  the deposit insur- 
ance system. Rather, the point is that we should be careful in approaching the 
task of reform. For example, the suggestion of subjecting offshore deposits in 
branches of U.S. banks to insurance premiums-whatever  its merits on other 
grounds-runs  the clear risk of further broadening the appearance of de facto 
full insurance, thereby changing the behavior of the one class of depositor that 
clearly exerts a powerful element of market discipline on major banks. I have 
similar  reservations  about  risk-based  deposit  insurance  premiums  on  the 
grounds that they may simply be viewed by some as a license to be even more 
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On the other hand, proposals to deal with the obvious abuses of the bro- 
kered deposit market, to find faster and surer ways to merge, close or take 
over seriously troubled institutions, and to strengthen both  the amount and 
structure of capital, all warrant careful study in a context in which the 1989 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) has 
already put in place a number of constructive reforms. At the end of the day, 
however, the keys are the factors I cited earlier: abundant amounts of capital- 
especially equity-like and unencumbered debt capital-and  a strong yet flex- 
ible supervisory apparatus. 
The seventh and final myth I want to mention is the idea that central banks 
can “solve” financial disruptions simply by providing  individual institutions 
or the  market  at large with  ample liquidity.  Before  going into this  subject 
further,  it  is important to recognize that  the contemporary central bank  can 
provide  liquidity  in at least two ways; one is the traditional  lender-of-last- 
resort function via the discount window and a second is through open market 
operations. Depending on the nature and source of  the disruption  either or 
both may be appropriate and either or both can provide important elements of 
flexibility, However, in the face of major uncertainties-especially  relating to 
the credit worthiness of  major institutions-there  is no guarantee that even 
the provision  of  generous amounts of  central bank liquidity can necessarily 
prevent  a  “disruption” from  becoming  a  “crisis.”  Larry  Summers’s  paper 
makes it plain that others recognize this possibility when he raises questions 
about the extent of moral suasion (arm twisting) on major banks in the wake 
of  the  October  1987 market break.  You  will  understand  why  I  object  to 
phrases like “arm twisting” but I hope that you will also understand my con- 
viction that in times of stress the central bank must be prepared to provide not 
just liquidity but also leadership-consistent,  of course, with the exercise of 
individual credit and business judgments by particular institutions in the mar- 
ketplace. But, for observers and practitioners  to assume that  central banks 
have a magic wand of liquidity and moral suasion that can overcome each and 
every problem is simply wrong and, even worse, dangerous. 
Having said all of that, there is another side to the lender of  last resort issue 
which is raised by both Friedman and Krugman. Specifically, Friedman raises 
the specter that the central bank will have to “cave” on inflation  in order to 
avoid financial disorder, while Krugman suggests the possibility that the pro- 
cess of providing liquidity to contain  a financial disruption  could trigger an 
international run on the dollar. These dangers are very real, but I believe it is 
possible to provide needed amounts of liquidity in the short run without nec- 
essarily having to compromise the basic thrust of  monetary policy, and I be- 
lieve that the events of October 1987 can be looked at in precisely that light. 
Needless to say, however, if a “disruption” tilts into a crisis, the balancing act 
becomes all the more difficult, although in those circumstances, immediate 
concerns about current and prospective inflation would be significantly damp- 
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Conclusion 
The focus of this paper is diagnostic rather than remedial. Therefore, I will 
not, at this time, attempt to outline a long or short list of public or private 
initiatives  that could reduce elements of  fragility  and volatility in financial 
markets. Nevertheless, throughout the text there are numerous comments that 
point in the directions in which I believe public policy should be moving. The 
first would be the importance of sound overall macroeconomic  and structural 
policies, keeping in mind that the roots of many of the financial problems we 
have  seen can be traced to the policy  fundamentals-fundamentals  that  in- 
clude the need to reform and modernize the structure of the financial system. 
The second would be that we not lose sight of the fact that the primary burden 
of  securing the safety and integrity of financial institutions and markets lies 
not with the authorities but with financial market practitioners and, most es- 
pecially, the directors and senior management of individual firms. 
3. Irvine H. Sprague 
Financial Risks and Crises 
First, I would like to congratulate Benjamin Friedman for his concise, lucid, 
very readable exposition of  where we have been, where we are now, and how 
we got here. 
I am particularly  pleased to see Hyman Minsky on the program. He and I 
spoke two weeks ago at a  somewhat similar  conference of  economists at 
Terni, Italy. To me it was most revealing. After those of us on the panel pre- 
sented our papers, the moderator would ask for questions from the audience. 
Someone would come up to the microphone and give a short speech and sit 
down. Then the moderator asked for another “question,”  and so on. Some- 
times the speeches related to what we were talking about. I am more used to 
speaking in the United States where audiences are not reluctant to challenge 
the speaker or at least to ask a question. I  see no shrinking violets  in this 
gathering. 
When Martin Feldstein  invited me to this conference he said to leave the 
scholarly research papers to the economists-“just  talk about your judgments 
based on your personal experience,” he said. That I will do. 
We all have thought a great deal about where we should go with regulation, 
supervision, and insurance for the financial industry. I perceive that opinions 
as they have jelled so far range from reregulation  to complete deregulation 
and from removing all insurance protection  to allow  “market discipline”  to 
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coverage for all. I  take the middle ground.  Leave things as they are for the 
time being. 
There are two hazards in seeking any change, and they are formidable. 
My proposal certainly is not what I expected to come up with when I began 
to think seriously about the process after Congress enacted the thrift bailout 
legislation this summer. It is a particularly unusual theory coming from one 
who proudly worked in the White House and who spent more than a quarter 
century in various positions serving Congress. 
My thesis is that the two principal hazards are the president and Congress, 
and  we  should  avoid  any situation  that  would  give  them  an  invitation  to 
meddle. I can illustrate my meaning with two examples. 
In 1970, during the days of Regulation Q, we regulators removed all inter- 
est rate ceilings on deposits of $100,000 and up. This was in response to the 
Penn Central collapse. I 
No problem. This deregulation  stayed on the books for a decade with no 
noticeable  adverse  impact.  Then,  in  1980, Congress  got  involved-disas- 
trousl y. 
Deposit  insurance had  increased in increments from $2,500 to $5,000 to 
$10,000 to $20,000 to $40,000 over the years. This time, Congress jumped it 
all the way to $100,000 in a precipitous and irresponsible move. At the time I 
proposed an increase to $70,000 to keep abreast of inflation. The House sup- 
ported this position,  but the Senate was taken in by the savings and loan lob- 
byists who wanted a vehicle to draw in funds by the billions to their institu- 
tions. 
We all know what happened. The juxtaposition of  $100,000 insurance cov- 
erage and no interest rate restrictions at $100,000 created an irresistible invi- 
tation to speculators and outright crooks. As we know, all interest rate restric- 
tions were lifted during the  1980s, but the damage was done.  Sharpies and 
get-rich-quick operators, as well as serious investors, were already drawn into 
the savings and loan web, where they would remain until the final disintegra- 
tion. 
After the 1980 legislation, money brokers could put together $100,000 de- 
posit packages and in all honesty say: “Not to worry-if  anything goes wrong 
the government will be the patsy.” How right they were. 
The money  brokers  did  not  limit their  sales efforts  to savings at home. 
Many banks were closed after money brokers swelled their deposit base. Penn 
Square, a good example, grew from a $30 million shopping center bank to a 
$500 million disaster. 
Greed, of course, was the driving force, but raising the insurance coverage 
was only step one by Congress. The thrifts now had a vehicle for drawing in 
I, To  my knowledge this was the only time ever that  all  13 regulators have gathered in one 
room.  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Arthur  Bums called us together-seven  Fed  members,  the 
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deposits; they did not have complete freedom to spend the money they were 
accumulating. 
No  problem.  Congress obliged  in the  1980 law-the  one that  gave  us 
$100,000 insurance-with  a slight crack in the door for thrifts to expand their 
horizons,  and they opened the door wide and threw away the key two years 
later in the Garn-St.  Germain Act. Now the thrifts could embark on a frenzy 
of speculation and fraud, gambling with and stealing from depositors’ money. 
Many did. 
One line I particularly enjoyed in the Senate committee report on the 1982 
bill was a statement that the experience of the deregulated thrifts in Texas was 
so rewarding that “these benefits” should be extended to all thrifts, state and 
national chartered alike. Texas as a role model-unbelievable.  So much for 
Congress; now the president. 
Drawing up a rescue plan for the thrifts was difficult enough, but it was just 
about impossible  to do it legitimately  because  of the president’s obsession 
with his ill-conceived campaign pledge of  “no new taxes.” 
Prior to the 1988 election you economists knew the thrifts were in trouble, 
but the public could not tell this fact from the administration’s  silence. The 
White  House  managers  were  terrified  at the thought that the true  situation 
would be revealed before the election. Then-surprise-just  a week after the 
election the White House discovered there indeed was a problem and it would 
cost the taxpayers billions of dollars.  How many billions became a moving 
target as the  administration  gingerly  started  with  a lowball  figure and then 
scaled the numbers in increments.  Today I believe their fantasy is that it can 
be handled with $167 billion. Don’t you believe it. 
When the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 
1989 was drafted, the president insisted that none of the rescue funds come 
from taxes that could be immediately identiJied and that none of the cost be 
counted against the Gramm-Rudman budget ceilings. We were going to spend 
a great deal of money and pretend it did not happen. 
The president’s insistence that all the costs be hidden off-budget is already 
causing  problems  and will  continue to do so. One telling  effect is that  the 
taxpayers will be stuck with an unnecessarily large bill, payable, of course, in 
later administrations.  It is too early to know with precision how much the no- 
new-tax pledge is going to cost the taxpayers. Certainly plenty. 
Knowledgeable  people like Dan Rostenkowski  and Leon Panetta tried  to 
derail this maneuver, but the bill was being considered on the last day before 
the  August  recess  and nothing  will  deter a congressman  from catching his 
plane home for a recess. While running the White House office, I coined the 
phrase “District work period” for these recesses,  so I guess we all resort to 
deception from time to time. 
A “compromise”  was adopted. Twenty billion dollars would be on-budget 
and raised by Treasury. The catch was that all of the money would have to be 
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tations. The other $30 billion would be off-budget and here again it would not 
count against Gramm-Rudman. How is that for open and honest accounting? 
Another provision to dupe the public is allowing the Resolution Trust Cor- 
poration (RTC) to borrow on up to 85 percent of the market value of the assets 
it holds. This allows administration witnesses to testify as they already have, 
with tongue in cheek, that they have no idea of the true cost of the bail out and 
will not know until the assets are finally disposed of. Translation: we will not 
have to confirm the true cost until the next election. 
Even more damaging is the provision that chips away at the traditional in- 
dependence of the FDIC. Treasury now controls two of the five seats on the 
expanded board, and with the president signaling who will be chairman, the 
administration gains a heavy hand. 
Worse yet, the Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) finally gets 
some kind of a handle on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
For as long as I can remember OMB has tried to squeeze the FDIC, demand- 
ing to pre-clear testimony, asking that the number of field examiners be cut 
back just at the time the banking crisis of the 1980s was unfolding, and gen- 
erally pecking away at the corporation’s independence. We  always stopped 
their efforts, but the financial structuring of the RTC may give them the open- 
ing they so long have yearned for. 
The FDIC is used to acting quickly, handling as many as six bank failures 
over a weekend. The RTC already is delaying the process, probably to estab- 
lish the fact that it is the boss. 
An independent FDIC is crucial. The principal reason for the shocking dif- 
ference between the FDIC and the Home Loan Bank Board was that the FDIC, 
operating with  nonappropriated  funds and  acting  at arm’s length  from  the 
banking  industry, has been  able to withstand pressures  from Congress, the 
White House, and the industry they regulated.2 
Already the fancy White House maneuvering is coming unraveled. Seeking 
to meet the October 1 spending deadline for the first $20 billion, Bill Seidman 
of the FDIC loaned the $8 billion he had not yet committed to five thrifts on 
September 30, just beating the deadline. 
The thrifts, selected because they were next in line to be unloaded by  the 
RTC, were to get rid of high cost CDs and buy government securities, which 
the RTC was to hold as collateral. The deal held for about 24 hours when 
Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady ruled that Federal law makes it illegal to 
invest  appropriated  funds  in  interest  bearing  instruments.  This  created  an 
acute embarrassment. 
Another problem occurs because, in their efforts to hold down the admitted 
cost of the rescue, Congress and the president did not make any provision for 
2. Etforts to crack the FDIC independence recur like clockwork.  Don Regan was particularly 
aggressive in the Interest Rate Deregulation Committee and during the Continental Illinois tra- 
vails. It was not a party matter. I withstood extraordinary Democratic White House pressure when 
they wanted to name my general counsel-the  person who selects law firms throughout the nation 
for the very, very lucrative business of  representing the FDIC. 57  The Risks of Financial Crises 
working capital. The RTC projections might possibly be accurate, but they do 
not take into account  the fact that the RTC must pay  for illiquid  assets up 
front. The asset disposition takes time. Under the FDIC guidelines, now being 
used by the RTC, an asset is not considered “dumped” if it is marketed for up 
to six months. Already pressures are building to force the FDIC to hang on to 
distressed properties for a much longer period. 
Seidman told Congress last week that he will need at least $25 billion in 
working capital above the amounts provided for in the legislation. 
A further problem is created by the fact that Danny Wall’s pumpkin deals in 
the final hours of the year are coming unraveled and many will probably have 
to be rerescued at a cost nobody knows. As we all know, a pumpkin deal must 
be done before midnight or you will turn into a pumpkin. 
We always had a rule of thumb when I was with the FDIC-the  situation at 
a failed institution would turn out to be worse than anticipated when you got 
inside the door for a good look at the books. With nearly 300 thrifts already 
turned over the RTC and another 300 likely to appear in the near future, there 
will be a bountiful harvest of surprises. 
So we have the threats from two sides-Congress  and the president. If any 
legislation begins to move there is no telling how it would be embellished by 
these two. 
The only sensible solution is to sit back and not support any legislation now. 
Let the  dust  settle and  see how  the  situation unwinds.  Perhaps  we need  a 
radical restructuring of the system, perhaps not. I know the urge to “do some- 
thing” is in all of us. The hardest task of  all is to sit tight. 
A final note. Keep criticizing the regulators. It is good for their soul. 
In that context I give you a story to think about. After the events surround- 
ing the Continental failure, I was talking with someone who is here today and 
was told that we should have let Continental close its doors, an opinion shared 
by many economists. He said: “It would be a great intellectual exercise. We 
could finally know whether or not the domino theory is true and whether the 
collapse  of  a money-center  bank  really  would  destroy  the  economy of  the 
nation.” 
4. Norman Strunk 
The Savings and Loan Story 
Even casual readers of the daily newspapers know a lot about the savings and 
loan problems  of the past five years.  Much has been  written  and  said with 
respect to the origins of  the problems and the resulting costs both to the thrift 
system and to the American taxpayer. 
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real estate at the University of California in Los Angeles, titled Where Dereg- 
ulation  Went Wrong-a  Look  at the Causes behind the Savings  and Loan 
Failures in the 1980s (Chicago: U.S.  League of Savings Institutions,  1988). 
In this  book  we  listed  15 different  reasons  for these  failures.  Today I will 
certainly not review this written record, but for what lessons it might have for 
us within the theme of this conference I will offer a five-minute summary of 
what, in my view, were the major reasons for this cataclysmic decade in the 
history of our specialized institutions. 
I begin by pointing  out that the savings and loan business was structured 
for a different period in our economic history-one  not characterized by high 
and volatile interest rates and downward sloping yield curves. It was created 
for the special purpose  of providing  an assured source of reasonably priced 
housing credit  for American  families when  upgrading our nation’s housing 
standard of living was considered an appropriate public policy objective. 
It did well in a simpler economy without today’s technology with respect to 
systems of  communication  and the use of computers  in the conduct of the 
banking business, a fact that has, for example, permitted the securitization of 
the mortgage market. 
Unfortunately, the savings and loan business did not change with the times. 
For this there were many reasons.  The Hunt Commission,  which functioned 
during the first term of the Nixon administration,  advocated major changes, 
including a phase-out of Regulation Q. This general prescription  for change 
was rejected by the business, which felt very comfortable with the status quo. 
It was rejected by the Realtors of America and the home builders, groups that 
wished to preserve our institutions as a captive source of credit. It was rejected 
by  the Congress, which also was concerned with preserving a certain source 
of  credit  for housing. It is quite clear that the business relied  for too many 
years on Regulation  Q and the one-quarter  of  1% price advantage that this 
program gave to our institutions. 
As a bit of history, you may be surprised to know that the U.S. League did 
not ask for or lobby for the imposition of Regulation Q when it was extended 
from the  banking business  to the thrift institutions in  1966. In fact,  we re- 
quested the two-year sunset provision in the original law. Once our business 
had Regulation Q, of course, it did not want to give it up. 
In the free-wheeling, deregulated environment of  the  1980s, the business 
clearly had inadequate supervision, both in terms of the authority provided in 
the basic law and from a woefully  inadequate supervisory and examination 
staff. The basic supervisory law was written by Congress in the Johnson ad- 
ministration.  The law was not looked at as to its adequacy in the Reagan era 
of  deregulation:  the new permissive  law of Garn-St.  Germain and the very 
liberal  lending  and  investment  authority  for  state-chartered  associations 
granted by many state legislatures,  primarily California,  Florida, Texas, and 
Arizona.  Requests for a larger and better-paid  examination and supervisory 
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to as a “fast whistle” did not come until 1984, during the chairmanship of Ed 
Gray. Chairman Gray’s requests for additional supervisory capability, both in 
terms of personnel and supervisory authority, did not receive support from the 
administration or the banking agencies, and Congress did not act on it. For 
the record, it should be noted that the savings and loan business, through the 
U.S. League, strongly supported Chairman Gray’s successful program to up- 
grade the examination and supervisory staff and endorsed a limited revision of 
the supervisory law to improve the ability of  the board to use its cease-and- 
desist authority. 
It is obvious that deregulation came first on the wrong side of  the balance 
sheet. There has been much finger pointing as to whose fault this was, but the 
fact is that deposit rates were freed while the business was sitting with some 
80% of  its assets in fixed rate, long-term mortgage loans-all  made when 
interest rates were much lower. This led to a decline in the tangible net worth 
of  the business from $32.2 billion at the end of 1980 to $3.8 billion two years 
later.  The business never really recovered  from this  destruction of  its  net 
worth. Many of  the failures we have seen the last two years have come as a 
result of  this earnings tragedy of  the early 1980s and the inability of  many 
institutions to take advantage of the breathing space provided by  what I have 
called the creative accounting arrangements allowed by  the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board in the 1982-84  period. These were intended to avoid the 
type of financial crisis that we are discussing at this conference-a  crisis as to 
the deposit insurance provided by  the FSLIC, which could well have spread 
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This type of  “forbear- 
ance” was similar in its intent to that provided by the State of  New York in the 
early 1930s with respect to the book valuation of the assets of  the state’s life 
insurance companies and savings banks. 
There were many regulations issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
under Chairman Pratt in the early 198Os, most of them of a liberalizing nature, 
with  two of  them  being  particularly unwise.  One  permitted an  unlimited 
amount of  money solicited by  the security brokers to be received under the 
cover of FSLIC insurance. 
The other damaging regulation, less obvious to students of  our history, re- 
duced the minimum number of stockholders from 400 to one and canceled the 
rule that no one individual could own more than 25% of the stock. The board 
also eliminated the requirement that the boards of directors of  these institu- 
tions be composed of  a variety of  individuals from the community or com- 
munities served by the institution. 
To  this very brief summary of the causes of savings and loan failures of the 
1980s must added, of course, the precipitous decline in the price of oil and 
the collapse of the real estate economy in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Colo- 
rado, and Arizona-which  caused many bank failures-as  well as the col- 
lapse of the savings and loan system in those states. 
In the context of this discussion today and the background paper by Benja- 60  Norman Strunk 
min Friedman, it is perhaps useful to note that the savings and loan crises of 
the 1980s did not stem from any one or a few unavoidable causes but, rather 
from many-most  of which, with hindsight,  were avoidable.  It should also 
be noted that (as costly as it may eventually prove to be) the savings and loan 
failures did not spread to our financial system at large or, in fact, even cause 
a  significant  downturn in  the real  estate and  home-building  sector  of  our 
economy. 
I ask the question whether this “non-event” as to our nation’s economy as a 
whole came from the fact that our financial institutions up to this point essen- 
tially have been  compartmentalized into several different  systems and from 
the public’s confidence in the integrity of the system of  federal insurance of 
deposits. In both instances I  think the answer is yes, which may have some 
lessons in our efforts to reduce the risk of financial crises. 
I have been asked to express some views as to the effectiveness of the re- 
forms of the thrift system enacted this past year by Congress. I would say that 
the reforms will certainly reduce the risk of any new wave of expensive fail- 
ures in the savings and loan system. This is true in part because the reforms 
were significant; additionally, I am not sure how much of a savings and loan 
business will be in existence five years from now to pose a risk to our broader 
financial system. 
Let me list quickly the reforms enacted by Congress this past year. First, 
there is now  a separation  of  the function of  insurance  from the function of 
chartering and supervision. I really do not  see how this reduces  the risk of 
institution  failure, but  many think  it  does. The insurance  function, as you 
know, is now provided by the FDIC. We hope it proves as good as its reputa- 
tion. Supervision has been  put into the Treasury  under the Office of  Thrift 
Supervision, which  functions in a manner compatible to the Comptroller of 
the Currency. 
The record of the Comptroller’s office over the years suggests this will be a 
risk-reducing  agency  rearrangement.  The personnel  of  the  Federal  Home 
Loan Banks will no longer be involved in supervision, and the bank presidents 
will no longer be the chief supervisory officers in the field. There will, I be- 
lieve, be more Treasury Department involvement in the Federal Home Loan 
Bank System, although the new law does not provide so specifically. 
The supervisory law has been revised to provide at least a “faster whistle” 
in the use of cease-and-desist orders and orders to remove officers and direc- 
tors. This has been provided to the bank supervisory establishment as well as 
to the Office of  Thrift Supervision. Much of  this new supervisory authority 
follows the changes asked for by Bank Board Chairman Gray for five years 
and unfortunately not given to him. There are, as you know, higher net worth 
standards, which, in effect, limit the authority of supervisory people to grant 
forbearance to those institutions  that  fall below reasonable  minimums. The 
practical effect of  this is yet to be seen. I think it will be very helpful.  Few 
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mum tangible net worth requirement, except for new institutions. In the late 
1970s, and again in the Reagan era, this minimum was reduced as a pragmatic 
way to keep mortgage money flowing into the Sunbelt and to reduce the reg- 
ulatory case load. 
The laws have been tightened, wisely, with respect to the ability of institu- 
tions to make loans or investments for land development, to engage in home 
building,  and to invest in junk bonds.  Intelligent limits have been placed on 
loans to one borrower. The FDIC has been given authority, in effect, to over- 
ride state laws with respect to the lending and investment  activities of  state- 
chartered savings and loans. One more reform is needed, and it can be accom- 
plished  by regulation.  The use of money from brokers should be limited to, 
say, 5% of total deposits, the rule from 1963  to 1982. 
In my view, the legislation enacted by Congress this year should substan- 
tially reduce the risk of savings and loan failures and any possible threat to 
our financial system. There is rightful concern, however, that we may have a 
case of “overkill.” Reducing the investment flexibility may be harmful rather 
than  helpful to the financial health of  the remaining institutions.  I am con- 
cerned about the effect of the higher limits on the percent of assets that must 
be  invested  in residential  related  assets, the so-called qualified thrift lender 
test. 
The savings and loan problem may well be back before Congress, but not 
because of failures of institutions that today are alive and solvent. It will be 
back before Congress because of the inadequacy of the funding and the oper- 
ations of the Resolution Trust Corporation. 
I suggested earlier that this new law together with the events of the past few 
years in our financial system generally may well mean the disappearance of 
the savings institutions as a certain and specialized source of home mortgage 
credit for middle-class America. Opinions will differ whether this might, or 
might not, be a desirable result from the standpoint of the functioning of the 
free market in this country, but it will not be a good result from the standpoint 
of our nation’s standard of living in housing. 
From the broader standpoint of our financial system and the risks of finan- 
cial crises, there will be increasing talk about deposit insurance reform. I per- 
sonally do not think it is politically realistic to expect much of a change. I do 
not think Congress will lower the $100,000 insurance limit. I do not think that 
a coinsurance  system is politically feasible. I  do not think it is practical to 
expect any administration to fail to provide de facto 100% deposit insurance 
for the large banks.  When crunch time comes, I believe the government offi- 
cials involved will conclude that some banks are, in fact, too large to fail. 
I am concerned with the increasingly broad scope of commercial bank op- 
erations and the virtual collapse of Glass-Steagall.  Things move too fast in 
banking these days for examiners and supervisors to detect and stop bad prac- 
tices in time to prevent major losses. I have seen in the savings and loan sys- 
tem the effect of examiners and supervisors not understanding what is going 62  Norman Strunk 
on and not dealing with problems in a timely manner.  I fear the same thing 
can happen in our commercial banking system. 
Further, let me say that the major banks in Texas did not survive the econ- 
omy in that state of  the  1980s. I am concerned as to what would happen  if 
conditions, such as we have seen in Texas, became common in several parts 
of our economy at the same time or if we have that long-overdue major eco- 
nomic downturn. 
As pointed out in the last chapter of the Strunk-Case book, major problems 
arose with respect to the system of deposit insurance operating in a deregu- 
lated environment. As I have said, I do not think that substantive changes in 
deposit insurance are politically possible. I hope that the alternative of effec- 
tive supervision and qualified people in supervision will be able to avoid the 
problems that deregulation with deposit insurance created for the savings and 
loan system. 
A “tough cop” mentality  is needed in supervision.  I personally  think that 
there is still too much “due process” protection to owners and management 
built into the supervisory law. The call of the supervisory officials in the field 
should not be subject to an “instant replay” review by a panel of judges in the 
press box. 
I also feel that much more use should be made of  the powers granted the 
supervisory agencies by the Change in Control Law, and maybe that law needs 
to be strengthened, although it was revised just three years ago. Banking-type 
institutions should not be the plaything of takeover artists or speculators, nor 
should they be subject to leveraged buy outs. I have seen too many bad results 
from the wrong kind of owners of our savings and loan associations. The same 
thing must not be allowed to happen in commercial banking. 
5. Joseph A. Grundfest 
When Markets Crash: The Consequences of 
Information Failure in the Market for Liquidity 
Few topics capture the public  eye as effectively as a stock market “crash.” 
Whenever stock prices drop sharply-even  if only for a very short period of 
time-Congress,  regulators, and the  press  quickly  demand  an explanation 
and begin a hunt for culprits who can be blamed for the market’s woes. These 
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efforts are invariably  accompanied by calls for new regulatory safeguards to 
prevent crashes from ever happening again. 
By now,  the political minuet danced in the wake of a crash is well under- 
stood. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity 
Futures Trading  Commission (CFTC) are charged to provide studies of the 
crash. Self-regulatory  organizations,  such as the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and Chicago Mercantile Exchange, empanel commissions to analyze 
the crash and to propose remedies. Meanwhile, many traders busy themselves 
blaming  other traders  for the  market’s  woes:  traditional  “fundamentalists” 
blame indexers, indexers blame specialists, specialists blame the futures mar- 
kets, and everyone finds reason to blame Congress and the regulators. 
Though this  sequence of events is quite predictable,  the political  demand 
for an explanation of market volatility nonetheless repeatedly manages to cre- 
ate an intellectual  vacuum  in Washington,  D.C. Inasmuch as nature abhors 
a vacuum,  the demand for explanation  is quickly filled by  legions of Wall 
Streeters, academics, and journalists who supply a groaning smorgasbord of 
diagnoses. These diagnoses typically range from the hilariously  implausible 
to the rigorously indecipherable. Indeed, with so many explanations to choose 
from, many policymakers have little trouble finding rationalizations that mesh 
with politically convenient predispositions. 
Many of the explanations  proferred  in the wake of  a crash are perfectly 
credible attempts to make sense of an infrequent, complex, short-lived, and 
turbulent  phenomenon.  Other explanations  are, however,  tinged  with  self- 
interest.  In particular,  it is clear that if  the  federal  government can be per- 
suaded that a particular  group is responsible  for market volatility, or that a 
specific form of intervention might cure the market’s ills, then some traders’ 
positions can be strengthened at the expense of others’. Rent-seeking behavior 
of this sort is hardly unusual, and the market volatility  debate would surely 
set a record if all its participants were interested solely in the public good. 
Reasons for Caution When Attempting to Explain 
Recent Market Volatility 
The specter of self-interest is not, however, the only reason to approach the 
volatility debate with care. It is important to recognize that the very nature of 
the volatility that is the subject of the debate limits the degree of confidence 
that we can have in any explanation of the market’s behavior. These limits on 
our ability to explain market behavior also limit the degree of confidence we 
can have in recommendations  for market reform.  By my count, there are at 
least five factors beyond  the customary  political  machinations  that  counsel 
intellectual caution in the volatility debate. 
First,  despite the  great  attention  devoted  to recent  market  volatility,  in- 
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stock market declines have drawn widespread public attention on fewer than 
1 percent of all trading days. When these declines occur, they also tend to last 
for relatively short periods of time. Efforts to explain market crashes are thus 
constrained by a small-numbers problem caused by the infrequency of market 
crashes and by the brevity of the events sought to be explained. 
Second, not all crashes are alike. Crashes happen for several different rea- 
sons and express themselves through several different mechanisms of action. 
Efforts to generalize about market behavior during periods of sharp, transitory 
decline  can  therefore  overemphasize apparent  similarities  while  brushing 
aside subtle but critical distinctions. More fundamentally, however, we must 
remember that markets learn as a result of  crash experiences.  For example, 
the market’s behavior during the crash of  13 October 1989, was influenced by 
its experience of  19 October 1987. In this sense, crashes are fundamentally 
nonreplicable  events.  The market’s inherent inability ever to suffer the same 
crash twice thus makes the task of explaining market volatility more difficult 
than it might otherwise be. 
Third, recent history teaches that, even if the markets could experience the 
same crash twice,  the government and  self-regulatory  organizations  stand 
ready  to prevent  any repetition.  In  particular,  following  the  October  1987 
crash, the markets adopted a new set of trading-halt rules popularly known as 
“circuit breakers.” The presence of these circuit breakers changed market be- 
havior in October 1989 and introduced a level of noncomparability  with the 
earlier 1987 experience. Following  the October 1989 crash, circuit breakers 
were again modified to address perceived weaknesses in the level of  intermar- 
ket coordination. Accordingly, it is already a sure bet that the regulatory en- 
vironment  accompanying the next crash will  be different from the environ- 
ment that existed during the October 1987 and October 1989 crashes. 
It is also a safe bet that, if and when the next crash occurs, the rules of the 
game will once again be changed as a result of  that crash experience. Efforts 
to explain market crashes will therefore  inevitably become embroiled in de- 
bates over the extent to which changes in the regulatory process either exac- 
erbated or ameliorated the market’s woes. 
This  process  of  perpetual  regulatory  adjustment  happens  for  perfectly 
understandable political reasons and is easily explained: to many policymak- 
ers, the unspoken objective of the regulatory  process is to eliminate the pos- 
sibility of  a crash and not simply to assure that crashes are, in some sense, 
equitable, rational, efficient, or justifiable. Crashes are politically unaccept- 
able. The fact  that  a crash has recurred  is interpreted  as evidence  that  the 
preexisting regulatory environment was somehow deficient. Accordingly, fur- 
ther regulatory tinkering is necessary to prevent a repetition of extreme market 
volatility. Thus, just as the market’s internal learning process causes sequen- 
tial  crashes to be  noncomparable (at least to some degree), the process  of 
regulatory tinkering compounds the challenge of explaining market behavior. 
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during a crash are extraordinarily difficult to quantify. Financial market behav- 
ior is fueled by expectations. Expectations, however, are not directly observ- 
able during the market’s gyrations and are only imperfectly measured after the 
fact. Economic analyses of market crashes, therefore,  generally rely on ob- 
servable  measures of  price  and volume that reflect  the consequence of  the 
interaction of underlying market expectations, and not the underlying expec- 
tations themselves.  I  Like physicists inferring the existence of subatomic par- 
ticles from droplets in cloud chambers, economists are often forced to infer 
expectations structures from observable stock market price and volume data. 
Physicists have, however, done quite credible work by tracking droplets in 
cloud chambers. Similarly, economists have made substantial contributions to 
the understanding of crashes by analyzing the path of prices and volumes dur- 
ing market declines. Although  these analyses are quite useful in debunking 
many theories about market behavior, and although they can support powerful 
inferences about the forces that give rise to market crashes, there is a level of 
explanatory power that studies based on price and volume data are unlikely 
ever to achieve. 
In particular, given the rapid pace at which expectations can change during 
market crashes and the extent to which individual expectations can be influ- 
enced by perceptions of  the expectations held by others, there is a level of 
cause and effect that will be difficult if not impossible to divine from observ- 
able price  and volume data. This inability  to measure  underlying  expecta- 
tions, combined with the difficulties encountered in conclusively demonstrat- 
ing the mechanisms of action that define the observed path of market prices, 
leaves the door open for policymakers to rely extensively on anecdotal evi- 
dence. It also provides a basis for some policymakers  to dismiss economic 
studies  as not  having  come to grips  with the forces of  fear and greed  that 
politicians often perceive as dominating market behavior during crashes. Put 
another way, it is easy for politicians to believe that “animal spirits” dominate 
the market during periods of sharp decline, and it can be difficult for econo- 
mists to dissuade policymakers from these animist beliefs. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, economists have reason to be cau- 
tious in their explanations of crash behavior because of the current state of the 
art in economics. Economics is simply not as advanced in explaining the ad- 
justment process whereby markets move from one equilibrium to another as it 
is in many other areas. As Franklin Fisher observed, “Economic theory is pre- 
eminently a matter of equilibrium analysis. . . . We have no similarly elegant 
theory of what happens out of equilibrium, of how agents behave when their 
plans are frustrated. . . . Unless one robs words of their meaning and defines 
1. It should be noted that not all economists limit their analyses to studies of price and volume 
data. For example, in the wake  of the 13 October 1989 crash, Robert Shiller and William Feltus 
surveyed market participants to find out about the expectation structures that  gave rise to their 
behavior. See  R. J.  Shiller and W.  J.  Feltus, “Fear of the Crash Caused the Crash,” New  York 
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every state of the world an ‘equilibrium’ in the sense that agents do what they 
do instead of doing something else, there is no disguising the fact that this is 
a major lacuna in economic analysis.”* 
The fact that economics is not as advanced in explaining adjustment pro- 
cesses as it is in describing equilibria does not, however, justify intellectual 
nihilism.  In particular,  it does not mean that “anything goes” in the effort to 
explain market crashes, or that  any explanation is as credible  as any other 
explanation. It suggests, instead, that a certain degree of humility may well 
be appropriate for anyone who ventures into the difficult and highly conten- 
tious political arena in which the volatility debate is likely to be fought. 
Why Crashes Happen: A Tentative and Partial Explanation 
Having described five reasons for caution in any effort to explain  market 
behavior during a crash, I will now ignore my own advice and attempt to offer 
an explanation for certain aspects of recent market volatility. In defense of this 
obviously impetuous decision, I can only point out that my call for caution is 
certain to be ignored widely in Washington and elsewhere. Thus, rather than 
be left totally out of the race to explain recent market volatility, I will suggest 
a tentative and partial explanation and then take comfort in the distinguished 
company I am sure to share when it comes time to name those who have been 
so bold as to attempt to explain the behavior of the stock market. 
More seriously, however, the explanation  I am about to offer differs from 
many  others in at least three respects. First, the explanation  is consciously 
tentative-unlike  some other explanations, which are presented as powerful 
solutions to a great mystery, what I present is more in the nature of a hypoth- 
esis to be mulled than of a truth revealed. Indeed, I will not feel overly embar- 
rassed if further analysis proves my explanation wide of the mark. 
Second, the explanation is consciously partial-even  if the explanation is 
eventually accepted as accurate, there is much still left unexplained and much 
work  remains  to be  done in  order to understand  market  behavior  during 
crashes. Because the explanation is partial it is also not necessarily inconsist- 
ent with several other explanations that have already been offered for the mar- 
ket’s behavior.  Nor is it necessarily  inconsistent with explanations yet to be 
offered. 
Third, the explanation is politically neutral in the sense that it points a fin- 
ger neither at New York nor at Chicago as the source of the market’s problems. 
Instead, the explanation suggests that the conditions leading to recent market 
volatility could well be the result of more fundamental problems shared by the 
2. F.  M. Fisher, “Adjustment Processes and Stability,” in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and 
Peter Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: General Equilibrium (New York: Norton,  1989). 36; 
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equities and futures markets alike. Effective remedies for the market’s woes 
might therefore lie in measures that address broader questions of market struc- 
ture and performance-particularly  matters related to the availability of infor- 
mation regarding order flows during times of high volume and volatility. Mea- 
sures of  this sort do not, however, currently appear to be high on the list of 
remedies being considered in the policymaking process. 
A Thumbnail Sketch of the Model 
Simply put, I suggest that a large component of recent market volatility is 
the rational result of an “information failure” in the market for liquidity rather 
than the consequence of rapid and irrational changes in the market’s assess- 
ment of  the value of securities traded on America’s stock exchanges. Infor- 
mation is the lifeblood of the market.3 In order to set stable prices, markets 
need information both about the business prospects of the companies whose 
shares are traded and about the demand for short-term trading services in the 
markets where those instruments are traded. The lack of  information about 
either fundamental business prospects or about the magnitude and composi- 
tion of  an atypically large demand for immediate trading can be sufficient to 
induce substantial market volatility. Indeed, as I later demonstrate, even infor- 
mationless trading can cause substantial price volatility, if the trading is suffi- 
ciently large and is of sufficiently uncertain magnitude and compo~ition.~ 
During recent crashes,  the markets have suffered from a serious lack of 
information about an anticipated spike in the demand for short-term trading 
a~tivity.~  The markets have been uncertain about the magnitude of  the ex- 
pected demand, about the reasons why certain traders are selling, and about 
the price levels at which substantial buying interest might appear. This lack of 
information makes trading quite risky.  In  response to this quantitative and 
qualitative uncertainty over the anticipated demand for short-term liquidity, 
which is in the nature of  a highly uncertain peak-load demand on traditional 
liquidity providers, the price of  liquidity rises sharply-that  is, it becomes 
quite expensive to purchase the immediate right to sell shares or futures. This 
sharp increase in the price of liquidity is reflected in a simultaneous widening 
of  spreads and in a general price decline in the equities and futures market 
alike.6  Indeed, in an environment in which the cost of trading rises sharply, as 
does the perceived probability of  having to trade more frequently, liquidity- 
3. See, generally, R. Gilson and R. Kraakman, “The Mechanisms of  Market Efficiency,” Vir- 
ginia Law Review 70 (1984): 549-644. 
4. See discussion of the “S&P 500 effect” and of volatility during “triple witching hours” in this 
text around nn. 12-13  and n. 17, respectively. 
5.  This spike in demand for trading can, of course, occur simultaneously with uncertainty over 
fundamental valuations, as discussed below. 
6. In  this regard, it  may also be  useful to  observe that some economic models suggest that 
“traders’ impatience” can affect the terms of  trade, particularly in dynamic markets. See, e.g., 
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related  transactions costs can have significant effects on stock prices.’ Once 
sufficient  information  comes to  the  market  describing  expected  short-term 
trading  flows,  and  once  the  returns  to  providing  liquidity  become  high 
enough, the peak-load  nature of  the demand  subsides, the risk  involved  in 
trading is reduced, the price of liquidity declines, spreads narrow, and equity 
prices recover a large portion of their losses. 
This explanation of market volatility, which relies on information failure in 
the market for short-term liquidity, is not inconsistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH). Among other assumptions, the EMH is based on the spe- 
cific understanding that “( 1) information be available to a ‘sufficient’ number 
of investors; [and] (2) that transactions costs be ‘10w.”’~  The uncertainty sur- 
rounding  peak-load  trading  demands suggests  that  information  relevant  to 
setting the price of  liquidity may not be available to a sufficient number of 
traders. It also suggests that transactions costs are not low because of the un- 
certainty generated by the information failure. Thus, if the information failure 
argument presented herein is correct, certain conditions necessary for the ap- 
plication of the EMH may not be satisfied during some sharp market declines. 
The information failure argument can thus be viewed as complementary to the 
traditional EMH, not as a challenge to or rejection of the EMH. 
The need  to analyze  separately  the  structure  of  information  flows about 
“fundamental” valuations and about liquidity demands is, I think, the critical 
link missing in many currently popular explanations of market behavior. Re- 
lated observations have appeared in academic analyses of market ~olatility.~ 
Unfortunately, these analyses appear not to have made a substantial change in 
policymakers’ approaches to the volatility debate beyond the somewhat sim- 
plistic and perhaps overly hopeful view that circuit breakers can slow trading 
sufficiently so as to allow more deliberate decision making to restore a sem- 
blance of equilibrium at prices reasonably close to those that prevailed prior 
to the market’s dislocation. 
The analysis presented herein  suggests, however, that circuit breakers,  in 
and of themselves, are not as important as the quality of information brought 
to the markets either while trading is halted or ongoing.  Remember that the 
markets had a two-day trading halt between October 16 and October 19, 1987. 
That two-day  halt,  popularly known as a weekend,  did little if  anything to 
prevent the market’s precipitous decline because, it is suggested, nothing was 
7. See, e.g., Y. Amihud and H. Mendelson,  “Liquidity and Cost of Capital: lmplicationa for 
Corporate Management,” Journal ofApplied Corporate Finance 2 (Fall 1989): 65 (estimating that, 
at a turnover rate of  once every two years, a 4 percent transaction cost reduces an asset’s net 
present value by 28 percent). 
8. James Lone and Mary Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence (Homewood, 
111.: Irwin, 1973), 80. 
9. See. e.p.. Grossman. “Insurance  Seen and Unseen: The Impact on Markets,” Journal  of 
Porrfolio Ma&ement  14 (Summer 1988): 5-8;  Gennotte and Leland, Market Liquidity, Hedging. 
and  Crushes  (School  of  Business  Administration,  University of  California  at  Berkeley, May 
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done to address the huge uncertainties  about the demand for short-term trad- 
ing that had accumulated over the weekend. Indeed, from a broader perspec- 
tive,  the analysis presented herein  suggests that many other frequently pro- 
posed solutions to the volatility problem are also likely to be ineffective unless 
they too address the information failure problems that can arise in the market 
for liquidity. 
Crashes and Crashettes 
This thumbnail sketch of market behavior suggests a distinction that I have 
found useful  in certain policy-related  conversations:  it is the difference be- 
tween “crashes” and “crashettes.”  A “crash,”  under my proposed nomencla- 
ture, reflects  a  sharp, fundamental downward reassessment  of  the intrinsic 
value of a financial instrument. Crashes can happen suddenly, but they are not 
transitory phenomena because asset prices are likely to remain depressed for 
substantial  periods  of  time following  the  initial  sharp decline. In contrast, 
“crashettes” reflect transitory uncertainties and peak-load demands that result 
from failures in the trading systems in which financial assets are exchanged. 
A crashette can come and go with prices returning to pre-crashette  levels in 
relatively short order. 
Rapid changes in stock prices need not, however, be purely the result of  a 
crash or crashette. Changes in fundamental information are also often corre- 
lated with sudden liquidity spikes. Any given instance of market volatility can 
thus be  viewed  as a combination of  crash and crashette  behavior,  with the 
crashette component having varying degrees of significance. 
Theory aside, there is reason  to believe that  a significant portion  of  the 
market’s recent volatility is much better described as the result of  a series of 
crashettes rather than  as the  consequence of  several  market  crashes.  Ob- 
viously, the problems presented by crashes are quite different from those pre- 
sented by crashettes, and the policy process would be making a serious error 
if  it  sought to treat  crashettes with remedies that  might  be appropriate  for 
crashes. and vice versa. 
A Closer Look at Liquidity 
In  order for this  information and liquidity-related  explanation  of  recent 
market behavior to be credible, there must be some friction in the process by 
which liquidity is drawn into equity-related markets.  If  liquidity were freely 
and  instantaneously  available to respond  to any level of  short-term trading 
demand, then  the notion  of  a sharp price  decline  due to uncertainty  in the 
market for liquidity would lose much of its persuasive force. 
This is neither an obvious nor noncontroversial proposition. To  the average 
small investor, the whole notion of  a market for liquidity is something of a 
cipher. The average investor who picks up the morning paper and reads the 
stock  quotes  sees  lengthy  tables depicting  the  prices  at  which  individual 
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the vast majority of small investors are largely  unaware that whenever they 
buy or sell stock, futures, or options they are paying a price for liquidity. 
Similarly,  the traditional  approach to market analysis incorporated in the 
capital asset pricing model, and other valuation models, does not address the 
possibility that sudden, large, and uncertain demands for trading, even when 
those demands are “informationless,”  can so deeply  influence  the market’s 
infrastructure  that prices are rapidly thrown  out of  equilibrium.  The notion 
that uncertainty  in the market for liquidity  can cause rapid, transitory price 
disturbances  is not  inconsistent  with accepted pricing models; rather it is a 
consideration complementary to and distinct from those models. 
To explain the importance of liquidity in the equities and index-futures mar- 
kets, it helps to revisit  some basic principles and to consider a hypothetical 
situation  in  which  the only  factor  influencing  market pricing  is a massive 
short-term change in the demand for liquidity. When attempting to explain the 
notion of liquidity to small investors, I often draw an analogy to the used car 
market. If I want to sell my car quickly, it is highly unlikely that I will know 
someone immediately interested in buying my car at a price anything close to 
the price I could get if I advertised for a couple of weeks. Under these circum- 
stances, if I want to sell my car quickly, or if it simply is not worth my time to 
try to sell it on my own, I am likely to sell the car to a used car dealer who 
will hold it in inventory until he finds a suitable buyer, The used car dealer is 
providing  a liquidity  service by  paying  me immediately for the car that he 
holds in inventory until a buyer comes along to take it off his hands. 
Used car dealerships are not, however, charitable institutions. They provide 
liquidity  only for a fee. That fee is measured by the difference between the 
price at which they buy and sell the same car. This spread between buying and 
selling prices is never posted on a big sign at used car lots and is never adver- 
tised in the paper.  However, the fact that the spread is not obvious does not 
mean that liquidity is free or that the size of the spread is immune to the forces 
of supply and demand. In particular, if used car dealers expect a sudden rush 
of  immediate selling interest by owners of used cars they will likely respond 
by lowering the price they offer to sellers even though the quality of the used 
cars they acquire remains unchanged and even though they expect to remarket 
those cars within a relatively short period at preexisting prices. 
Just as there are firms that specialize in providing liquidity to the used car 
market, there are firms that specialize in providing liquidity to the equity and 
futures markets.  Thus, even if there is no “long-term” investor who immedi- 
ately wants to buy the 500 shares of General Mills that I want to sell, there is 
a “used stock dealer” who, for a fee, will buy those shares and hold them in 
inventory until an interested buyer comes along.  lo 
10. Accordingly, there is a sense in which the equities and futures markets cease to behave as 
“spot” markets during periods of  extreme volatility because the size and risk of inventory  rises 
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The amount of  capital ready to provide liquidity in the equity and futures 
markets at any one point in time is, however,  finite and is determined by the 
risk-adjusted rate of return provided to that activity. In addition, there is rea- 
son to believe that the total pool of liquidity capital, while large in absolute 
dollar terms, is actually  quite small  when measured  as a percentage  of the 
value of the assets traded in the equities and futures markets. 
For example, the Brady Commission found that the total capitalization of 
specialists on the floor of the NYSE is approximately  $3 billion.” While $3 
billion  is a lot of  money  by  some measures, it is less than one-tenth  of  1 
percent of the outstanding value of equity investments.I2 No doubt, the liquid- 
ity provided by specialists is supplemented by locals in Chicago’s pits, over- 
the-counter  market  makers,  and  upstairs  block  positioners.  However,  I 
strongly suspect that even if accurate data about the quantity of liquidity cap- 
ital available from these sources were available, we would find that immedi- 
ately available liquidity capital is only a small percentage of the total value of 
equity instruments, open futures interest, and open options interest that could 
be traded on the market. 
In the vast majority of  situations, the amount of capital available for liquid- 
ity purposes is adequate and the typical trader barely notices the price that is 
charged for the  temporary use  of  the market’s  liquidity  capital. However, 
when suppliers of liquidity capital have reason to believe that there will be a 
sudden and sharp increase in demand for transaction services, and when there 
is substantial  uncertainty over the magnitude and qualitative contour of  that 
demand, a totally different scenario emerges. 
?’he Origins of  Crashettes 
There is, by now, widespread agreement that instances of market volatility 
typically begin with one or more pieces of  news that disturb preexisting price 
levels and suggest that some equity prices should be lower. Debate continues 
to  rage,  however,  about whether these pieces of  news  are really  powerful 
enough to cause multibillion  dollar changes in  valuation  across  the  entire 
spectrum of  equity investments  traded  in U.S. markets. This debate can, I 
think, be cut short if, instead of examining the effect of certain news items on 
the fundamental valuation of  equity,  futures, and options markets, we focus 
on the effect that news has on the demand for liquidity services. 
Given current market structures, it is not difficult to conceive of  situations 
in which news items suggest that relatively moderate changes in fundamental 
valuations  might be accompanied by  substantial  short-term demands for li- 
quidity. This may be particularly true under circumstances in which liquidity 
1 I. Presidential Task  Force,  Report of  the Presidential  Task Force  on Market Mechanisms 
(Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office,  1988), VI-40. 
12. The Wilshire Associates Equity Index, which measures the market value of NYSE, AMEX, 
and OTC issues, stood at $3,419.879 billion as of  29 December  1989. See Market Indicators, 
New York Times (30 December 1989, p. 21, col. 3). 12  Joseph A. Grundfest 
suppliers believe  that (a)  a significant percentage of  asset holders  intend to 
follow mechanistic trading rules that cause investors to sell as prices decline 
(stop-loss rules or portfolio insurance strategies would fit into this category) 
or (b) the need to meet margin requirements is so substantial that a meaningful 
amount of  selling will  ensue as a result of wealth  constraints and leverage 
effects. Whether these beliefs are accurate is, in a sense, beside the point so 
long as the beliefs are widely held and acted upon. 
The belief that risk arbitrageurs will quickly have to sell billions of dollars 
of  stock to cover losses resulting from one “busted’ deal is an example of  a 
scenario that describes the latter situation. This scenario also fits many popu- 
lar descriptions of market behavior at about the time of the October 13, 1989 
market crash. The belief that portfolio insurance would swamp the market in 
October  1987 fits the former scenario and is also consistent with widespread 
press reports prevalent at that time. 
It is interesting that the key  variable  in each of  these scenarios is the ex- 
pected demand for short-term truding services. It is not the actual demand for 
trading services as later observed in the market, or the aggregate anticipated 
price change based on “fundamentals” that is expected to result from the new 
information coming to market. This is a critical distinction that is supported 
by several collateral observations. 
Studies have, for example, demonstrated that statistically significant price 
changes accompany the announcement that a particular issuer’s shares are to 
be added to the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 Index. Typically, the price of 
these shares increases for a relatively short period of time and then gradually 
declines. These price changes occur even though there is absolutely no change 
in the fundamental information describing the issuer’s business.  Instead, the 
short-lived price increase is generally ascribed to a transitory liquidity effect 
that results from a large demand by index funds for immediate possession of 
the issuer’s shares so as to minimize the tracking error between their fund’s 
behavior and the behavior of the S&P 500 Index.I3 
These studies have important implications for the analysis of market vola- 
tility  because  they  demonstrate  that  “informationless”  trading  can  induce 
stock price volatility provided that the trading creates a sufficiently unantici- 
pated demand for liquidity. Indeed, this effect, which has been clearly dem- 
onstrated for a single issuer’s shares, may well be generalizable to the entire 
market, as I now explain. 
The Purest Crashette 
The existence  of a measurable  stock price  effect attributable solely to an 
informationless demand for liquidity suggests an interesting Gedunkenexper- 
iment. Suppose that, instead of changing one stock in the composition of  the 
13. See, e.g.,  Harris and Gurel, “Price and Volume Effects Associated  with Changes in the 
S&P List,” Journal of Finance 41 (1986): 815-29;  C. Lamoureux and J. Wansley, Market Efects 
of  Changes in rhe S&P 500 Index (Department of  Finance, Louisiana State University, February 
1986); Standard & Poor’s Corporation, S&P 500:1989 Directory (New York, 1989), 91-102. 73  The Risks of Financial Crises 
S&P 500, Standard and Poor’s announced an immediate reconstitution of the 
entire S&P 500 Index with significant changes in the weighting and composi- 
tion of that benchmark portfolio. The result would likely be great uncertainty 
in the short-term trading market as participants scrambled to guess how index 
funds would attempt to rebalance their portfolios. This uncertainty would be 
compounded by a lack of  information about the likely trading strategies of 
“closet indexers” and of  other investors whose portfolio compositions are, one 
way or another, keyed to the composition of the S&P 500 Index. 
In  all probability, the price of  short-term liquidity would rise in response 
both to the expected marketwide demand for immediate portfolio rebalancing 
and to the great uncertainty associated with the pace and potential magnitude 
of  the rebalancing activity. The prices of  some shares would increase as a 
result of an increased weighting in the index while the price of  shares whose 
weighting was reduced would likely suffer a transitory decline. On balance, 
however, the increase in the price of liquidity caused by  massive rebalancing 
would be reflected in a decline in average stock prices which would likely be 
reversed once all the rebalancing had been accomplished. In other words, after 
all is  said and done,  the prices of  IBM and GM  shares should not change 
much, if  at a11,14 as a result of the reconstitution of the S&P 500 Index, but 
there may well be an interim period during which prices could be higher or 
lower depending on whether the issue’s weighting has increased or decreased. 
The result would be the purest of  all crashettes: a transitory price decline 
wholly unrelated to any change in the fundamental valuation of any asset. 
The critical point to note, however, is that a crashette need not occur even 
under these extreme circumstances if Standard and Poor’s provides the market 
with sufficient advance warning of the changes that it intends to make in the 
composition of its benchmark portfolio. Such advance warning would provide 
market participants an opportunity to eliminate much of the uncertainty asso- 
ciated with anticipated liquidity demands and thereby reduce the risk premium 
demanded by  liquidity providers. It would also allow portfolio managers to 
moderate the pace at which they rebalance their portfolios and thereby avoid 
generating peak  load demands on  the  supply of  immediately available  li- 
quidity. 
Attracting More Liquidity: Why Doesn’t It Happen Faster? 
No doubt, when crashettes visit the market the rate of  return to liquidity 
providers increases substantially. Why  then does more money  not  quickly 
rush into the market and thereby rapidly restore a semblance of  order? There 
appear to be at least two answers to this question.I5 
14. Whether prices change at all depends on whether there is a longer-term S&P effect. See, 
e.g., P. C. Jain, “The Effect on Stock Price of  Inclusion in  or  Exclusion from the  S&P 500,” 
Financial Analysis Journal 43 (January-February  1987): 58-65. 
15. A parallel question can, of course, be asked about the opposite side of the market: if the 
price  of liquidity rises so substantially and quickly, why do sellers keep demanding liquidity? 
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First,  although the absolute return  to liquidity  providers  trading  during 
crashettes  might  seem  substantial  when  measured  in  hindsight,  the  risk- 
adjusted  rate  of  return, given the uncertainty  that exists at the time of  the 
crashette, is not necessarily out of line with other prevailing risk-adjusted rates 
of return. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the uncertainty during a crash- 
ette can become so great that the price of  short-term Treasury  instruments 
experiences a transitory run-up as a consequence of a “flight to quality.” This 
observable price change in what is probably the most liquid financial market 
in the world, combined with anecdotal indications that some large traders pull 
back from the market at least during the initial phases of volatility,  suggests 
that the uncertainty  causing a crashette can be of a sufficient calibre to force 
liquidity out of the market precisely at the time the market needs it the most. 
Second, it is important to recognize that the process of providing liquidity 
to the market can involve a relatively high degree of  specialization that is not 
quickly acquired. Experience in judging the information  content associated 
with certain patterns  of order flows, as well  as the ability quickly to gather 
reliable  information from the cash and derivative products  markets,  can be 
extraordinarily  valuable in managing funds during periods of  market volatil- 
ity.  Simply put, many investment  managers  who pride  themselves on their 
ability to pick “winners”  and avoid “losers”  (though  in reality they may do 
neither) do not believe they have a comparative advantage in trading during 
periods of volatility.  Moreover, these investment managers are either unwill- 
ing to provide capital to traders with that specialized expertise or are unaware 
of traders who have the necessary skills. 
The observation  that  there  are gains from specialization  that  result  from 
experience  in  judging  the  informational content  of  order  flow  is  hardly 
unique.  The observation  appears in analyses of specialist and market-maker 
behavior.  It  also appears in  studies that  hypothesize  the  existence of  “in- 
formed” and “noise” traders.  l6 For present purposes, however,  the essential 
are concerned that there is a tremendous overhang of selling yet to come may be willing to pay a 
high current price for liquidity in order to avoid an anticipated price that is even higher. Sellers 
who have decided not to sell because of the high price of liquidity do not, however, have a practi- 
cal means of signaling that they have no interest in adding to the  demand for liquidity. In particu- 
lar, the prospect of massive legal liability could well deter major traders from announcing a policy 
of abstinence during periods of volatility because, if  market conditions changed and the grader 
decided that he wanted to sell, he would open himself to allegations of market manipulation and 
fraud. Thus, it is possible for sellers to be demanding liquidity in order to avoid a selling wave 
that will not come. 
There is reason to believe that such behavior may have been  at work during October 1987’s 
market volatility. The volume of  selling by  portfolio insurers was substantially less than some 
traders had feared, but there were no practical means for insurers to signal that they would not be 
selling the anticipated volumes at prevailing market prices. Accordingly, many traders may have 
generated a demand for liquidity based on expectations that were incorrect but that could not be 
promptly adjusted. 
16. For example, Gennotte and Leland (see n.  9 above), hypothesize the existence of three 
classes of  investors: uninformed  investors who observe only the prevailing equilibrium  price; 
price-informed investors who also have access to unbiased predictors of future price; and supply- 75  The Risks of Financial Crises 
observation is that not all investors are equally well-situated to trade during a 
crashette. Models that assume rapid and continuous entry by “fundamental” 
or “value-oriented’ investors  may therefore  oversimplify  some of  the infor- 
mational difficulties that arise during periods of unusual volatility. 
Strategic Behavior and the Possibility of “Crazy Eddie” Pricing 
There is also reason to believe that, during market crashettes, at least some 
traders engage in a form of  strategic  behavior  that  links stock prices much 
more closely to liquidity considerations than to any assessment of the market’s 
underlying  value.  These strategic  considerations  are perhaps best described 
by way of an example. 
Suppose the Dow Jones average stands at 2600 immediately before the ar- 
rival of information that triggers a crashette. A trader estimates that, after the 
market absorbs the news, prices will reequilibrate at a Dow of 2500. To com- 
pensate for the risk that this estimate is incorrect, the trader decides not to buy 
until prices drop as low as 2550. 
However, suppose the trader also perceives that the price of  short-term li- 
quidity is about to skyrocket as a result of both the peak-load  nature of the 
demand for trading services and the uncertainty associated with the magnitude 
and composition of that demand. Under those circumstances, liquidity-related 
considerations could well cause prices to fall below the 2550 level at which 
the trader would be induced to buy on the basis of fundamentals alone. From 
the trader’s perspective, if he is happy buying at a price of  2550, he’s even 
happier buying  at a price of 2450, or 2300, or 2200. As long as the trader 
believes that liquidity considerations are likely to force prices even lower, the 
trader has little incentive to buy even though he believes the market is oversold 
on the basis of “fundamentals.”  (This example assumes, of  course, that the 
trader does not change his estimate of post-shock pricing as a consequence of 
the information he subsequently observes in the market-surely  an unrealistic 
assumption, but one that simplifies the example.) 
When will such a trader enter the market and start buying? When he be- 
lieves that, given the immediate supply and demand for liquidity, prices are so 
low that unless he starts buying now he may not find prices as good after the 
market recovers. Equivalent prices will be unavailable because the market is 
so thin that his orders are unlikely to be filled at better prices during the recov- 
ery. Put another way, the trader may estimate that the peak price of liquidity is 
about  to be reached  and that the discounts associated  with the demand for 
informed investors who observe order flow information. They find that the presence of  an  ade- 
quate number of supply-informed investors is critical to  avoiding crashette-type behavior. The 
point  I am suggesting is that, given usual trading patterns, there is an  optimal amount of capital 
that is allocated to supply-informed  traders. This amount of capital is not, however, so large that 
it is able to  absorb the peak-load demand for trading that accompanies a crashette. Moreover, 
there are perfectly understandable institutional reasons why more capital does not quickly flow to 
these investors during times of market stress. 76  Joseph A. Grundfest 
liquidity are about to decline. Under either circumstance, the trader’s decision 
to buy stock or futures is determined by conditions in the market for immedi- 
ate liquidity rather than assessments of postequilibrium stock market values. 
This explanation  of trading behavior may provide a rational basis for the 
observation that prices during crashettes no longer reflect assessments solely 
of  the “fundamental”  value of shares traded on an exchange. That does not, 
however,  mean that the prices observed during crashettes are irrational be- 
cause crashette prices may be sending more information about liquidity con- 
ditions than about fundamental values. Given the level of uncertainty and the 
peak-load nature of demand for liquidity that accompanies a crashette, short- 
term price declines may be perfectly  understandable,  if uncomfortable,  con- 
sequences of rational market forces. 
This behavior pattern can be described in a somewhat more colorful fashion 
that will be particularly familiar to New Yorkers. For many years, New York’s 
airwaves were filled with advertisements starring a pitchman for “Crazy Ed- 
die,” an electronics and appliance retailer who claimed to have prices so low 
that they were “insane.”  The message was that Crazy Eddie’s prices were so 
good that you could not afford not to shop at his store. That, in a sense, may 
describe  the price  signal sent during a crashette that triggers  some traders’ 
decision to reenter the market-prices  are so low (because the price of liquid- 
ity is so high) that it makes sense to buy even if there is a chance that prices 
might drop lower still. 
Information Problems and Information Solutions 
If this analysis is generally correct, it suggests that recent incidents of short- 
term volatility have been caused, at least in part, by information problems in 
the market for immediate liquidity. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
we might want to look for information  solutions to these information prob- 
lems. 
Interestingly,  this is an area where regulators have actually experienced a 
modicum of  success.  During  1985 and 1986 the most significant complaints 
about market volatility were caused by “triple witching hours.” These quar- 
terly events were the result of the simultaneous expiration of futures and op- 
tions contracts that created informationless peak-load demands for liquidity at 
precisely the market’s closing price. Market participants knew beforehand ex- 
actly when there would be large liquidity demands but did not know the mag- 
nitude of those demands or the specific stocks in which the demands would be 
greatest. 
To  reduce the volatility  associated  with  triple witching hours,  regulators 
and self-regulatory  organizations  modified trading procedures in the futures, 
options, and equities markets.  Contract  expirations  were  moved  from  the 
close to the open, new requirements  were introduced calling for earlier sub- 77  The Risks of Financial Crises 
mission  of  trading orders,  and new  opening procedures were  adopted that 
gave the market a better view of the volumes likely to be bought or sold at the 
open. As a result of these measures, traders had better estimates prior to the 
open of  just  how much demand for trading was likely to arise and of just 
where that demand would likely be centered. In other words, the regulatory 
environment was changed so as to generate more information about the de- 
mand for a very particular and immediate form of liquidity. 
These relatively simple measures appear to have eliminated most of  the 
volatility associated with triple witching hours. Moreover, triple-witch vola- 
tility appears to have been eliminated at very low cost and with no perceptible 
market inefficiency or dislocation. 
There is a lesson to be learned here. Regulators have already successfully 
eliminated a particular form of  liquidity-induced volatility by  increasing the 
amount of information available to the market. Granted, this task is particu- 
larly easy when the peak-load demand on liquidity happens like clockwork 
because of  the structure of contracts traded on futures and options markets. 
Reducing volatility through information solutions at other times will be more 
difficult, but it might not be impossible. 
What is needed is more information about the magnitude and composition 
of the demand for liquidity, particularly when the market experiences substan- 
tial volatility. This information can be provided through a variety of channels. 
In no special order, and recognizing that other approaches may be preferable, 
I will describe two possible means of increasing liquidity-related information 
in the event of  extreme volatility. Moreover, I should emphasize that I am not 
endorsing either of these proposals as measures that should be adopted. In- 
stead, the primary purpose of articulating these information-related remedies 
is to stimulate consideration of  approaches that have not been  broadly ex- 
plored or debated. 
The first and perhaps simplest approach would be to require that, in the 
event of unusual volatility, traders announce their orders ahead of  trading and 
perhaps also identify themselves if  their orders are sufficiently large. Such a 
requirement would provide the market with information about the forthcom- 
ing demand for liquidity and not just about present and past demand. It would 
also provide the market with information about sellers’ identities, from which 
the market could infer both the extent to which selling is informationless and 
the extent to which more selling might be forthcoming.” 
This proposal could, of course, be modified in a variety of ways. The prean- 
nouncement period could either be quite short (e.g., requiring announcement 
immediately before the actual entry of an order) or it could be relatively long 
17. A similar proposal is discussed by Gary Becker; see “Lassoing Herd Instinct for the Good 
of  the Market,” Business Week (20 November 1989), 20. (“If booms and busts in stock prices are 
caused by limited information, stock performance could be improved by more of it. For example, 
advance announcement of  large institutional orders coming to market-sunshine  trading-might 
give investors better information about the sources of  price changes.”) 78  Joseph A. Grundfest 
(e.g., requiring  announcement 15 minutes or more prior to execution  of  an 
order). Longer announcement periods would have to address the possibility 
that traders can legitimately decide to cancel preannounced orders, as well as 
the possibility  that some traders  might behave strategically and enter orders 
that they never intend to execute. The proposal would also be relatively cheap 
to implement and would not require that regulators have any ex ante view as 
to whether volatility is the result of a crash or of a crashette: in either event 
the proposal would call forth additional information. 
No doubt, a major drawback of this approach to some traders will be the 
loss of  anonymity currently available in the market. The basic policy issue, 
however,  is  whether the  benefits  resulting  from increased  information  out- 
weigh the costs associated with the loss of anonymity in situations of extraor- 
dinary volatility. I* 
The second approach would be to halt continuous trading once a specific 
volatility level is reached and require that trading then be conducted through a 
single-price auction. In a single-price auction buyers and sellers indicate the 
volumes of business they would be willing to do at various prices. This infor- 
mation  is then  conveyed to all  market  participants  in  a form analogous  to 
supply and demand curves that illustrate the prices at which markets would 
clear.  By  requiring  that all  trading  occur through  the  single-price  auction 
mechanism, the market would be guaranteed that it knows the total demand 
for liquidity, at least until the next single-price auction is held or until contin- 
uous trading resumes. 
The single-price auction has been actively promoted by  Steve Wunsch of 
Kidder Peabody. Although  it has several appealing  information  characteris- 
tics, a complete single-price auction for hundreds or thousands  of  financial 
instruments might be difficult  to  implement, particularly  during  periods  of 
great volatility when a substantial amount of price-search activity is ongoing. 
Moreover, single-price auction systems would also have to address the possi- 
bility of strategic behavior by buyers and sellers who might enter indications 
of interest that they pull before trading commences. This approach could also 
expect to draw opposition from locals, specialists, market makers, and other 
intermediaries whose services would not be needed because the auction mech- 
anism effectively allows buyers to do business directly with sellers. In addi- 
tion, this approach would  require the introduction of  several new  electronic 
systems. Accordingly, a single-price auction approach might be easier to jus- 
tify on a cost basis if single-price auctions were used regularly, regardless of 
the degree of price volatility-a  possibility that may deserve consideration for 
reasons wholly independent of volatility concerns. 
1 X. Certain traders who want to preserve anonymity might seek to transact offshore in markets 
that are not  subject to equivalent disclosure requirements.  Liquidity  for U.S. shares in  foreign 
markets is, however, likely to be even worse than it is in the United States, and these traders will 
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Conclusion 
There is substantial reason for caution in any attempt to explain recent mar- 
ket volatility. Nonetheless, there is cause to believe that a material part of the 
volatility recently experienced in the equity market is attributable to informa- 
tion  failure in the  market for liquidity.  In  particular,  instances  of  volatility 
appear to be correlated with peak-load  demands for immediate trading and 
with  great uncertainty about the  magnitude  and  composition of  these  de- 
mands. 
This observation  is supported by  evidence that large volumes of  informa- 
tionless trading can move the price of individual equities, as well as the price 
of the entire equity market. This observation also supports the policy recom- 
mendation that information failures should be addressed by information solu- 
tions.  Measures designed to increase  the flow of information  about the size 
and  composition of  the market’s  demand for liquidity  may  be  particularly 
worthy of further debate and consideration. 
Summary of  Discussion 
Friedman began  by  pointing  out that the discussants’ remarks were focused 
on financial institutions and financial markets. He emphasized that the behav- 
ior of nonfinancial entities matters too, because their behavior affects the qual- 
ity of the credits held by financial institutions.  He posed the question whether 
regulation and supervision can control the quality of those credits. Friedman 
added that, despite the high visibility  of  the breakdown  of  the savings and 
loan system, that  breakdown  did not result  in a financial crisis, although  a 
banking system failure might produce such a crisis. 
William S. Haraf felt that the problems of  savings and loans were greatly 
understated by the discussants’ comments. The true culprit in the S&L failure 
is deposit insurance, which long predates the 1980-82  deregulation.  He then 
outlined two key problems for the future of the brnking system. The first is 
determining the extent of coverage provided by deposit insurance. He noted 
that  since the failure of  Continental  Illinois,  when, on grounds of  fairness, 
contingent creditors were  protected  as well  as  depositors, regulators  have 
adopted “too small to fail” as well as “too big to fail.” Consequently, there is 
little  market discipline left  in  the  current system. The second  problem  is 
understanding whether regulation can prevent institutional failure, and at what 
efficiency cost. Haraf pointed out that various changes in the deposit insurance 
system have been proposed  that would restore some market discipline to the 
banking industry. 
Lawrence B. Lindsey went on to say that the beginning of the unraveling of 80  Summary of Discussion 
the savings and loan industry was disintermediation and the government’s re- 
action to the problem. Under Regulation Q, disintermediation created serious 
problems for the construction industry, but preserved the integrity of the sav- 
ings and loan industry. Further, the process was self-correcting as the resulting 
recession in the construction  industry cooled off loan demand, thus bringing 
interest rates back down to levels consistent with Regulation Q. The gradual 
deregulation of interest rates and the banking industry generally was an effort 
to limit the  impact of monetary policy  on construction  and  spread it more 
generally  across the  economy.  The result  was  a shift in riskiness  from the 
construction  industry  to  savings and  loans and the elimination of  the  self- 
correcting link between disintermediation and a recession in construction. 
Sprague responded  to Haraf that after the Penn Square failure,  he had fa- 
vored a “modified payoff’ policy, in which insolvent banks were closed and 
depositors immediately  received  100% of all deposits below $100,000. De- 
positors also receive a percentage payment on the uninsured deposits based on 
the expected future sale value of their share of the bank’s assets. This policy 
was employed eight times but was ignored in May 1984 when the consensus 
of regulators was that Continental Illinois had to be saved. 
Paul A.  Volcker also answered Haraf, saying that whether banks could be 
“too big to fail” depended on the meaning of the word “fail”; although Conti- 
nental Illinois creditors were paid, the stockholders lost. He argued that finan- 
cial  regulators  must  act  differently  with  the  current  “tenuous  institutional 
background’ than with a “robust institutional background.”  Alternative strat- 
egies were tried with Continental Illinois but failed. It is a misinterpretation 
of this episode to say that no bank would ever fail. Volcker noted that small 
banks are essentially protected  by  deposit insurance alone, since they have 
few deposits over $100,000.  He wondered how,  in general, we can ensure 
protection from crisis without protecting inefficiencies in the banking system. 
Feldstein asked  Volcker whether  we wanted  to rely on supervision or to 
build in risk-sharing arrangements. Volcker responded that we need both and 
felt that lowering the $100,000 insurance limit and introducing copayments 
for deposit insurance made economic sense but seemed politically impossible. 
Michael Mussa explained  that if  the increase in corporate leverage was a 
response to greater macroeconomic  stability and thus less economic risk, it 
should be viewed as a good thing. So the important question is whether we 
have encouraged too much leverage in some way. At the end of the Civil War, 
equity was 40% of banks’ total assets but is only about 3%-4%  today. One 
reason for the change is risk sharing by the federal insurance agencies. If only 
equity and not subordinated credit is at risk in a failing bank, then only equity 
should count toward  the capital requirements.  Further, capital requirements 
should be large enough that the average failing bank draws no public funds. 
Robert J. Shiller addressed Grundfest’s remarks by agreeing that psychol- 
ogy was important but disagreeing with Grundfest’s specific theory. Financial 
panics are marked not by public insanity but by rapid shifts in public opinion. 81  The Risks of Financial Crises 
The opinions held  at any one time are not  unreasonable; there are usually 
“experts” expositing them.  The problem is that people change too sharply 
from one expert to another. People pay closer attention to the markets when 
they are unstable, so they are more likely to change their minds. Closing mar- 
kets is unlikely to help this problem. 
Edward J. Kane returned to the issue of regulation and supervision of  the 
banking system. The recent reform of the regulating agencies gave the agen- 
cies new powers but also established grace periods before capital requirements 
can be enforced, left loopholes in the capital requirements, and resulted in a 
diversion of  personnel to handle the failing institutions. The key error at the 
regulatory agencies has been measuring their success in the short run by fail- 
ure rates rather than by the net capital reserves of the insurance funds. Savings 
and loans’ losses developed in the mid-1960s and throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s, but, until the mid-l980s,  the FSLIC covered up the problems. 
Kane emphasized the importance of insurers’ reporting net, not gross, capital 
reserves for themselves and regulated institutions based on mark-to-market 
asset values, with tough fraud laws to prevent deception. He proposed “esca- 
lating and predictable” penalties for a declining capital base, focusing on forc- 
ing shareholders to “buy back” the institution by  investing more money or 
watch the institution close. 
William Poole  reminded the group that  any proposal to make depositors 
bear some of the losses of  a failing institution must take account of the fact 
that short-term assets are always subject to a run. This fundamental problem 
of  instability cannot be overcome by programs aimed at depositors but must 
instead be addressed by increasing the amount of equity or long-term debt. 
Sidney Jones asked the panelists to consider the sources of  the regulatory 
failure of the savings and loans. He raised three possibilities. First, was the 
financial system inherently too complex to regulate? If regulators are working 
eight hours per day to enforce obsolete regulations and institutions are work- 
ing 24 hours per day to beat the system, risk sharing arrangements will be 
necessary. Second, does the ability of  financial institutions to move between 
different regulatory environments pressure regulators to  soften their rules? 
Third, has the quality of the regulatory personnel been a problem? Jones said 
that, as a political appointee for 20 years, he can attest that they vary in qual- 
ity. In particular, he was concerned about the turnover among appointees and 
their lack of previous experience. He summarized his views as a support for 
more supervision of institutions and less protection if they fail anyway. 
Feldstein asked whether less protection for creditors is politically feasible 
and whether it would encourage more careful institutional behavior anyway. 
Individuals with less than $100,000 in bank accounts are probably not sophis- 
ticated financial analysts. Would credit rating agencies develop to help such 
depositors assess the risks of  different institutions? Jones repeated his belief 
in limitations on deposit insurance. 
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between the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and the FDIC was the 
ability of the FDIC to ignore the special pleading of  Congress and the presi- 
dent, an ability the FHLBB did not have. 
Strunk agreed with Jones’s suspicion that the FHLBB had a very inadequate 
examination  staff in terms of size, ability, and experience.  This was due to 
direct congressional control of the agency and low salaries. The FHLBB was 
also cautious in dealing with failing institutions due to a likely federal court 
review of their actions. 
Paul A. Samuelson discussed the origin of  the saving and loan problems in 
Congress’s desire to help the real estate industry. By legislating a system with 
short-term deposits and long-term loans, they created the potential for honest 
institutions to go under water if interest rates were highly variable. This dan- 
ger preceded the moral-hazard and agency problems stressed by Kane. 
Richard  F:  Syron agreed  with Jones and Samuelson that the  Home Loan 
Bank Act of 1932 was inherently flawed, as the intent of Congress to promote 
home ownership became interpreted as an intent to promote the savings and 
loan industry.  A system where the goal of the regulator was to promote the 
regulated industry (a majority of directors of the Home Loan Banks were from 
the institutions being regulated) could only work in a stressless world. 
Samuelson discussed another approach to the insurance issue based on his 
personal money management, namely individual choice of mutual funds hold- 
ing assets of varying risk. 
Feldstein added that James Tobin had recently supported the so-called nar- 
row bank concept in which individuals could have many types of mutual fund 
accounts but government insurance would apply only to deposits correspond- 
ing to government or AAA short-term bonds. 
Grundfest went on to say that the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
given serious thought to popularizing the simple observation that limitless in- 
surance is available at zero premium if one puts one’s money into a money 
market mutual fund that invests in U.S. Treasury instruments. If one wants a 
return greater than the riskless rate, one needs to take some risk, but all of the 
legitimate  reasons  for deposit  insurance  can be  fulfilled  by  money  market 
funds that hold Treasury securities. 
Richard D. Erb described other structural rigidities in the banking system 
that increase risks to individual institutions.  The most important are limita- 
tions on asset choice, limitations based on geography because of restrictions 
on inter- and intrastate branch banking, limitations on the size of  institutions, 
and the historical link between the mortgage market and the savings and loan 
industry.  He proposed  moving toward  requiring a broadly  defined portfolio 
distribution for all institutions covered by deposit insurance. Opening up the 
diversification  possibilities for savings and loans was a good step but was too 
limited, as remaining geographic limitations led to concentrated high-risk in- 
vestments, as in the Southwest. 
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gerous for the economy. Although the public associates default with shutdown 
and layoffs, in fact the company usually continues in business with a new set 
of  shareholders, as the old shareholders are wiped out and the debt holders 
become shareholders. Why is this conceptually  distinct from a business that 
operated with zero leverage and faced hard times? Hall noted that there is an 
alternative  view  that default is more costly,  as David Cutler and Lawrence 
Summers showed that  the stock  market capitalized  the cost of  Texaco  and 
Pennzoil's  reorganization  in the billions of dollars. This loss greatly exceeds 
the direct costs, and the source of the extra loss is unknown, but there is no 
evidence  that combined employment fell. Further, as defaults become  more 
common, both their perceived and actual costs will fall. 
Hall continued that the crucial question for banks is whether lending con- 
tinues unabated  after defaults. The answer appears to be yes for real estate 
loans, but  is less clear for business loans, for which there is no secondary 
market; this  means that funding and loan origination  are done by the same 
institution.  The idea that  a  financial crisis  reduces  business  investment be- 
cause it precludes business borrowing is much less true than it used to be. 
Feldstein emphasized that the conference's  concern is not with individual 
institutional failure but with the possibility of a systemic breakdown. Has the 
deposit insurance system acted as a brake on that breakdown process? 
Friedman concluded by asking whether systemic failures differ from indi- 
vidual failures in a fundamental way. If they do, then Hall's approach of think- 
ing about one institution in a world where other institutions are operating nor- 
mally will not be a sufficient analysis. 